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IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE RIGHT TO
PROCREATE: THE RIGHT TO NO
WILLIAM A. SIECKt
INTRODUCTION
Unable to conceive by sexual intercourse, a woman and her husband are
now pregnant with their second child. How? Her eggs were fertilized by
his sperm in vitro-in a laboratory. Some of these fertilized eggs were im-
planted into her uterus, while others were frozen to make future attempts
possible. The couple's success with in vitro fertilization ("IVF") gives them
an opportunity to be parents, but leaves them with a difficult decision. They
still have seven more frozen embryos. He is happy with only two children,
while she wants to try to use the frozen embryos because they are made
from the couple's eggs and sperm. Despite their differences, the couple is
not worried about resolving the matter because they "trust each other." For
other couples, however, trust has been insufficient when spread thinly over
broken dreams.1 These couples, too, were unable to conceive through inter-
course. The enormous expenditures of time, energy, and money required by
the IVF process, however, were unavailing. When these unsuccessful cou-
ples have divorced, disputes over the disposition of the frozen embryos have
not been easy to resolve.2 For example, one person sought custody, claim-
ing one last, best chance to become a parent. The other person objected
strenuously, fearing both the financial burden of mandatory child support
payments and the emotional burden of separation from children whose ex-
istence was imagined only within marriage.
t B.A., 1991, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate, 1999, University of Pennsylvania.
With love for Jieney Kim Sieck and in memory of Kirin James Sieck and Hugo Evan Sieck, I
offer some thoughts on marriage and children. My love and gratitude also go to my parents,
my sister, and my brothers for making family more than a historical construct. Finally, and
without attributing agreement, the critical comments of Professors Barbara Bennett Wood-
house and Seth Kreimer, and the tireless work of my fellow Law Review members have made
this Comment better than I alone ever could. Errors are mine.
I This description is based on the experiences of two couples, set forth fully infra Part III.
2 "Success" precludes neither divorce nor dispute. See supra note I and accompanying
text. This textual paragraph should not be read as an assertion to that effect. Rather, it is
based on empirical disputes and does not deny equally tragic possibilities.
3 See infra Part I (describing actual IVF custody battles). While both cases discussed in
Part I involved women seeking custody over the objection of a man, the roles could be re-
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Two state high courts have decided such disputes, each reaching a
similar result.4 Although the courts applied different analytical approaches, 5
both articulated a preference for a contract framework to resolve the com-
peting claims of the divorcing spouses.
6
This Comment argues that contract analysis, as between prospective
parent-donors, is inadequate and inappropriate for resolving disputes over
frozen embryos. Further, the interests of the parties ought not be balanced.
Rather, the right to veto implantation should inhere in each party. Thus, in
the absence of contemporaneous, mutual consent, the embryos of a married
couple must not be implanted and those of an unmarried or divorced couple
must either be discarded or donated for research.
Part I provides background information regarding the need for and na-
ture of IVF. In Part II, the legal issues implicated by dispositional disputes
are elucidated and explained. Part III details the facts and frameworks of
the Davis and Kass decisions. Part IV analyzes and rejects the preference
for contract frameworks. Part V then considers the rights and policies in-
volved in IVF disposition disputes. This Comment advocates a bright-line
versed. In fact, a New Jersey case presents just such an alignment See Genaro C. Armas,
Court Says Divorced Woman Can't Use Her Five Fertilized Eggs, Ci. StN-TIMEs, May 8,
1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 5579719 (describing a sealed case where a man sought cus-
tody of frozen embryos while his ex-wife wanted them destroyed).
4 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 & n.1 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that when a couple
divorced, unused preembryos-defined as "eggs which have been penetrated by sperm but
have not yet joined genetic material"--were to be donated to a clinic for research as provided
for in an agreement made prior to cryopreservation); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604
(Tenn. 1992) (holding that an ex-husband's preference to let a clinic dispose ofpreembryos
should prevail under the circumstances). Moreover, the results dictated by both courts accord
with recommendations of other commentators. See, e.g., Elisa Kristine Poole, Allocation of
Decision-Making Rights to Frozen Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67, 93 (1990) (advocating a
default rule that embryos should not be implanted in the absence of an agreement between the
donors); Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, Comment, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procrea-
tive Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?, 27 CONN. L. REV.
1377, 1402 (1995) (arguing that the right of the party not to procreate outweighs the right of
the party seeking to reproduce because of the ireversibility of procreation and the psycho-
logical burden it places on an unwilling parent).
As will be explained, this Comment challenges the construction of the Constitution that
equates the right to procreate with the right to avoid procreation. See infira Parts II, IV-V.
Moreover, the doctrine of contract is rejected. See infra Part IV. This Comment does not dis-
pute the results reached by the Kass and Davis courts, but rather, the means of reaching those
results.
5 Compare Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180-81 (stressing that the prior agreement between the
parties should be presumed to be valid and binding and that any ambiguities in the agreement
should be analyzed using common law contract principles), with Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04
(halancing the competing interests of the parties in the absence of an express statement of in-
tent by the parties).
6 See infra Part III (summarizing the holdings in Davis and Kass).
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approach which would permit either party to veto further attempts at IVF
and would require that the embryos be discarded.
I. THE WHAT AND WHY OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Many couples are unable to have children7 for varied and complicated
reasons. In 1978, however, Louise Brown, the first "test tube baby," was
born, and the world learned that infertility could be countered. 9 In the last
twenty years, the development of alternative reproduction technologies
7 See Institute for Science, Law, & Tech. Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation
of Fertility Techniques, 281 ScI. 651, 651 (1998) [hereinafter ISLAT Working Group] (esti-
mating that "one of six American couples ... are infertile"); John A. Robertson, Embryos,
Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL.
L. REV. 939, 945 (1986) (noting the increasing rate of infertility among certain population
segments); Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Other-
wise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 526 (1994) (noting that 15% of reproductively active couples "experi-
ence some difficulty having children").
The statistical increase in infertility rates has been challenged. See Virginia Rutter, Who
Stole Fertility?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 46, 47 (suggesting that fertility rates
have not been falling, but rather that social and technological changes contribute to a height-
ened awareness and intolerance of"biology in the reproductive process").
The actual fertility rate is irrelevant to this Comment. More important is the increased
reliance on fertility clinics. See George J. Annas, The Shadowlands-Secrets, Lies, and As-
sisted Reproduction, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 935, 935 (1998) (noting the growth of the infer-
tility industry); Gina Maranto, Embryo Overpopulation, SCI. AM., Apr. 1996, at 16 (expecting
the use of IVF clinics to continue to rise); Rutter, supra, at 48 (noting that the infertility in-
dustry is growing rapidly). Also critical is the consequent increase in frozen embryos subject
to dispute. See Maranto, supra, at 16, 18 (expecting the number of frozen embryos to groxv);
Judy Peres, Giving Birth to Controversy, Cm. TRIB., July 21, 1998, at I (observing that ap-
proximately 100,000 frozen embryos are stored in the United States).
8 See Owen K. Davis & Zev Rosenwaks, In Vitro Fertilization, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE
ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY 2319, 2320-22 (Eli Y. Adashi et al. eds.,
1996) (describing tubal factor infertility (tubal and pelvic adhesive disease), endometriosis
(ectopic occurrence of endometrial tissue), male factor infertility (low motility, low concen-
tration, and decreased normal forms), idiopathic infertility (unexplained infertility), immuno-
logic infertility, and in utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES)); Tanya Feliciano, Note,
Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 306-07 (1993) (ex-
plaining that sexual intercourse sometimes fails to result in pregnancy because sperm are in-
capable of fertilizing an egg, because there are an insufficient number of eggs, or because
there are complications with a woman's fallopian tubes or uterus); Alise R. Panitch, Note, The
Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
543, 546 (1991) (attributing infertility, in part, to "changes in sexual behavior and the in-
creasing age at which" women are attempting to conceive a child); Rutter, supra note 7, at 65
(noting that causes of infertility are approximately 40% female factors, 40% male factors, and
20% unexplained).
9 See P.C. Steptoe & RG. Edwards, Birth After the Reimplantation of a Human Embryo,
2 LANCET 366, 366 (1978) (announcing the birth of a healthy infant). For a popular account
of the event, see The First Test-Tube Baby, TIME, July 31, 1978, at 58, describing the birth of
the first test-tube baby.
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("ARTs"), including IVF, has provided an opportunity for many couples to
bear children who share the couple's genetic blueprints.'
0
IVF is a process whereby a woman's eggs are fertilized by a man's
sperm with surgical medical assistance.11 Generally, the first stage of the
process is a controlled ovarian hyperstimulation, designed to produce large
quantities of eggs.12 There exists a positive correlation between the number
10 See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2320 (discussing the prominence of tech-
nologies such as IVF in infertility treatment); see also P. R. Brinsden & P. A. Rainsbury, In-
troduction to A TEXTBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND AssIsTED REPRODUCTION 21,
21-26 (Peter R. Brinsden & Paul A. Rainsbury eds., 1992) (offering a short historical sum-
mary of in vitro fertilization); ISLAT Working Group, supra note 7, at 651 (noting that "par-
ents now seemingly have greater control over how they bring children into the world" due to
the qrowth of IVF in the last 20 years).
More precisely, in vitro fertilization is "an assisted reproductive technique wherein
oocytes are retrieved from the ovaries and fertilized extracorporeally with subsequent embryo
replacement." Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2321. "Oocytes" is the precise term for
the female gamete contribution, popularly known as eggs or ova. The term "ova," however,
does not find its way into the scientific literature very often, and thus will not be used.
For purposes of this Comment, the term "in vitro fertilization" will be used to describe
fertility treatment whereby a man's sperm and woman's oocytes are combined ex corporeal in
a laboratory environment. IVF is actually a subset of the broader area of "assisted reproduc-
tive technologies." See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or
Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 609, 619-20 & nn.41-47 (1997) (noting that "ART is com-
prised of numerous methods used to match female and male gametes and successfully implant
the joined material in a woman's body" and listing acronyms for the "slightly varied" tech-
niques); Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2320 (alluding to other ARTs); Louis N.
Weckstein et al., Gamete/Zygote Intrafallopian Tube Transfer, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE
ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 2335, 2336-52 (describing
gamete intrafallopian transfer as an alternative to IVF). The differences among the techniques
generally are not relevant to this Comment. Rather, the critical factor for this Comment is the
presence of cryopreserved embryos, the use of which becomes a source of irreconcilable dif-
ferences for some couples. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (explaining the
cryopreservation process).
This is the process of "pharmacologic stimulation of the ovaries ... with the objective
of multi-follicular recruitment and hence retrieval of multiple oocytes." See Ilan Calderon &
David Healy, Endocrinology of lVF, in HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 1, 4-12
(Alan Trounson & David K. Gardner eds., 1993) (discussing endocrine evaluation for suit-
ability and stimulation protocols); Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2321, 2324-27 (dis-
cussing controlled ovarian hyperstimulation techniques); Francois Olivennes & Rend
Frydman, Friendly IVF: The Way of the Future?, 13 HuM. REPROD. 1121, 1121 (1998) (sug-
gesting that "ovarian stimulation protocols have increased the amount of drug injected" into
the woman which "may not be good for women's health and may not be the optimal treat-
ment"); Robertson, supra note 7, at 948 (explaining the use of hormonal stimulation to in-
crease egg production); Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive Technology: In Vitro
Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Donated Gametes and Embryos, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 828, 829 (1988) (describing the use of fertility drugs to induce ovulation and
increase egg production). It is not uncommon for 10 or more eggs to be extracted in one pro-
cedure. See John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 407,407 (1990).
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of eggs produced and pregnancy rates.13  After the eggs have been
produced, they are retrieved surgically in a procedure known as
"aspiration." 14  The retrieved eggs are then inseminated, and those
that are fertilized are incubated for one to three days before they are
ready to be implanted in the woman.15 At the time of implantation,
the fertilized eggs may be zygotes, preembryos, or embryos.16  The
13 See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2324 (noting that "most ART programs rou-
tinely employ controlled ovarian hyperstimulation in an effort to maximize pregnancy rates");
Allan Templeton & Joan K. Morris, Reducing the Risk of Multiple Births by Transfer of Two
Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization, 339 NEWENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1998) (concluding that
"the chances of a live birth are related to the number of eggs fertilized, presumably because of
the greater selection of embryos for transfer"). Because each stage in the process (production,
retrieval, fertilization, implantation, conception) is less than 100% effective, beginning with
the greatest number of eggs possible allows for the best odds from stage to stage. Retrieving a
larger number of eggs not only increases the likelihood of pregnancy but also reduces the risks
to the woman of repeated aspiration surgery. See Robertson, supra note 7, at 948 (noting that
"the chance of pregnancy is very small if only one fertilized egg is transferred to the uterus");
Seibel, supra note 12, at 829-30 (describing aspiration methods). In the absence of a means to
preserve the fertilized eggs, the maximum number possible must be implanted before they
expire in the laboratory. See Marcia Joy Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social
& Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1986) (noting that some clinics, in or-
der to avoid the problem of "spare" embryos, remove only the eggs they expect to implant
into the woman's uterus). 1
14 See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2328-29 (describing laparoscopic oocyte re-
trieval and ultrasound-guided oocyte retrieval); Jeremy Osborn, Oocyte Retrieval and Matu-
ration, in HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 12, at 17, 18-29 (describing
procedures used for the "collection, identification, and assessment of human oocytes"). "Ini-
tially, laparoscopic follicular aspiration was the dominant method of oocyte recovery." Davis
& Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2328. Laparoscopic procedures require general anesthesia and
insertion of a needle through the abdomen. See id. (describing laparoscopic oocyte retrieval
as being "performed under general anesthesia" and involving the insertion of a needle); see
also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tenn. 1992) (describing a series of subcutane-
ous and intermuscular injections, aspiration with a needle inserted through the abdomen while
the woman is anesthetized, and implantation within 48 to 72 hours). Techniques which are
"more sophisticated and more directly oriented to the patients' needs" have been developed,
see Osborn, supra, at 18, and although these techniques are still invasive, they are less so and
have become the "method of choice." See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2328.
15 See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2329-31 (explaining methods of insemina-
tion, whereby oocytes are exposed to sperm, and the transfer of fertilized oocytes, now called
preembryos or embryos).
16 See DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1859 (28th ed. 1994) (defining
"zygote" as the "cell after synapsis at the completion of fertilization until first cleavage"); id.
at 542-43 (defining "embryos" as "derivatives of the fertilized ovum that eventually become
the offspring, during their period of most rapid development, i.e., after the long axis appears
until all major structures are represented"); Alan Trounson & Jeremy Osbom, In Vitro Fertili-
zation and Embryo Development, in HANDBOOK OF IN VrIRO FERTILIZATION, supra note 12,
at 57, 58-80 (describing development and transfer options); Lucinda L. Veeck, Cryopreserva-
tion of Embryos/Eggs, ;n 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 8, at 2353, 2355 (providing precise definitions of the terms "zygote," "preembryo,"
and "embryo"). The preembryo occupies an interim stage of cell development.
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differences are biologically significant, but do not alter the legal
analysis.
17
There is another positive correlation between the number of
embryos transferred or implanted and the rate of pregnancy.' 8  As
greater numbers of embryos are implanted at one time, however,
multiple pregnancies become more likely, which pose risks to a
woman's health.19  The tension between increasing pregnancy rates
and protecting a woman's health has been eased by the ability to cry-
opreserve embryos in excess of the number to be implanted z0 These
17 This is because a state may not limit the fundamental, constitutional rights of a person
in favor of an entity which is not constitutionally protected. See infra Part H1 (providing an
overview of the relevant legal issues); see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592-94 & n.15 (review-
ing scientific testimony and noting that the distinction between embryo and preembryo is not
dispositive); Annas, supra note 7, at 937 (calling the term "pre-zygote" "meaningless" and the
term "pre-embryo" "euphemistic" because, "the most meaningful distinction is between extra-
corporeal embryos (over which male and female gamete providers have equal say) and im-
planted embryos (over which the pregnant woman has the ultimate decision-making author-
ity)").
The biological differences are developmental. The legal irrelevance is due to the lack of
an independent, constitutional interest of the embryo and of a limit on the State's interest if
the donors' fundamental rights are implicated. See infra Part ll.B (discussing the constitu-
tional rights of privacy as they relate to procreation and family).
is See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2330 ("Pregnancy rates rise as the number of
embryos replaced increases."). This connection is has been challenged. See Templeton &
Morris, supra note 13, at 576 (finding that transferring more embryos increases the risks of
multiple births "without necessarily improving the overall success rates of in vitro fertiliza-
tion'). This challenge does not affect this Comment. The number of unused embryos, and
not the number used, is critical. Moreover, using fewer embryos per implantation may actu-
ally increase the number in storage, thus exacerbating the problem of unused, disputed em-
bryos. See supra note 11.
19 See id. at 2330-31 ("Beyond three or four embryos, however, the risk of high-order
multiple gestation can increase sharply . . . ."); Trounson & Osbom, supra note 16, at 80
("Under optimal conditions, the maximum number of oocytes or embryos transferred should
be restricted to two or three .... ).
One article in a medical text notes that "[a] better pregnancy rate has consistently been
correlated to a greater number of transferred preembryos .... However, the incidence of
multiple pregnancy increases .... The risk of obstetrical and perinatal complications is
higher .... In addition, decreased obstetrical risk is of particular importance for certain [IVF]
patients..... Veeck, supra note 16, at 2364; see also Templeton & Morris, supra note 13, at
573 (observing that "[t]he high rate of multiple births resulting from in vitro fertilization is a
major health issue" with considerable "medical, social, and financial consequences").
20 "The cryopreservation of gametes and embryos involves an initial exposure to cryo-
protectants, cooling to subzero temperatures, storage, thawing, and finally... retum[ing] to a
physiologic environment which allows further development" Jillian M. Shaw et al., Cryopre-
servation of Occytes and Embryos, in HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION, supra note
12, at 213, 214. See generally Veeck, supra note 16, at 2354-64 (describing cryopreservation
methods).
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embryos remain frozen, awaiting future use.
21
The ability to produce, fertilize, and preserve a number of eggs in one
aspiration makes the IVF process less physically demanding on a woman
and more promising for a couple. When the donors disagree with each other
about the disposition of their frozen embryos, however, serious legal ques-
tions arise. Before considering the leading appellate decisions concerning
the disposition of fertilized eggs, Part II briefly describes the principal legal
issues involved.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ISSUES INVOLVED
IVF permits time to lapse between the fertilization of a woman's eggs
and conception.22 This Comment focuses on disputes between once-married
donors with respect to custody and disposition rights over frozen embryos.
These particular cases involve three questions. First, what is the legal na-
ture of a frozen embryo? Second, should a couple's prior agreement matter
in deciding disputes once the couple is no longer married? Third, if a prior
agreement is inappropriate, inadequate, or unavailable, how should courts
decide disputes over disposition?23 Subpart A provides a simple overview
21 "Perhaps the most valuable prospect of a cryopreservation program is the ability to
enhance a patient's opportunity for pregnancy from a single stimulation cycle. If implantation
falls after fresh transfer [the first, non-cryopreserved implantation], a second (or third) less
expensive and less stressfil attempt can be undertaken ... ." Veeck, supra note 16, at 2354.
To some extent, time favors implantation. This is because fertility treatments make the uter-
ine lining less receptive to implantation in the short-term in order to induce ovulation. See
Robertson, supra note 7, at 949 (noting that cryopreservation has helped to increase patient
success rates by allowing patients to postpone embryo transfer). Further, the ability to cryo-
preserve preembryos reduces the cost of overall IVF procedures for most couples: the cost of
aspiration is nearly five times the cost of transfer to the uterus. See Delunel, supra note 4, at
1382 & n.36 (citing Judy Licht, Frozen in Time: Storing of Embryos Boosts the Chances of
Pregnancy,-And Raises Ethical Questions, WASH. POsT, Nov. 26, 1991, at Z10, for the
proposition that the cost of extraction and implantation of a single egg is $10,000 and the cost
of transferring thawed embryos is about $2000).
It is not clear how long cryopreserved preembryos will remain viable. Most experts rec-
ommend no more than 10 years in storage. See Wurmbrand, supra note 13, at 1098 (citing the
10-year limit on storage recommended by the British Committee of Inquiry into Human Fer-
tilisation and Embriology). Healthy babies have been born from preembryos frozen for eight
years. See Leslie Berkman, Embryos, Eggs and Ethics, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, at Bl.
22 "Fertilization" is "the act of rendering gametes ... capable of further development" by
fusion of gamete material. DORLAND's ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 16,
at 617. "Conception" occurs later and is marked by implantation "in the endometrium." Id at
365. Consequently, it is possible to fertilize an egg in vitro, implant it in the uterus, and not
conceive. See id. at 617 (defining "in vitro fertilization").
23 Science may be close to solving the problem. In the last year, children were born from
eggs which had been frozen separate from sperm and which were fertilized after thawing. See
Jeffrey Kluger, Eggs on the Rocks, TME, Oct. 27, 1997, at 105, 105 (noting the first U.S.
births of children from eggs frozen before they were fertilized).
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of the legal nature of a frozen embryo. Subpart B then explores and inter-
prets the relevant federal constitutional doctrine surrounding the rights of
the family and the right to procreate.
A. A Frozen Embryo: Person, Property, or Special Respect?
Fertilization outside the body is a recent phenomenon which raises le-
gal, moral, and ethical dilemmas. Central to these dilemmas is a disagree-
ment as to what a frozen embryo is. The growing literature on this subject
suggests that there are three essential beliefs about the ontological reality of
frozen embryos: person, property, or something other.
24First, some argue that the embryo is a person. This analysis assumes
that a human being exists at fertilization. 25 Statutes in at least two states ar-
The considerations outlined in this Comment, however, are far from moot. First, cryopre-
servation of unfertilized eggs is only in its infancy, and is not "ready to go mainstream." Id.;
see also Maranto, supra note 7, at 18 (cautioning that "[e]gg freezing is still highly experi-
mental ... and may never pass muster"). Second, hundreds of thousands of cryopreserved
embryos remain in storage and await disposition. See id. at 16, 18 (predicting that the number
of cryopreserved embryos in the United States, now approximately 100,000, will continue to
grow); Peres, supra note 7, at 1 (concurring in the estimate of 100,000 cryopreserved em-
bryos). Third, the narrow reading of the right to procreate advanced in this Comment, see
infra Parts I.B and V, is relevant to the government's ability to adequately regulate the IVF
industry. See Annas, supra note 7, at 937 ("The abortion model of private decision making
has been used to resist the regulation of assisted reproduction .. "); Concerns About Assisted
Reproduction, 351 LANCET 1524, 1525 (1998) (suggesting that regulation should be focus of
scientific and governmental inquiry); ISLAT Working Group, supra note 7, at 651 (arguing
that "reproductive technology has been insulated from regulations that apply to other medical
fields"). This Comment seeks to narrow the IVF discussion by reference to the Constitution
and to narrow the constitutional interpretation by reference to the IVF context.
24 See The Warnock Report on Human Fertilisation and Embryology, §11.11, in MARY
WARNOCK, A QUEsTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN FERTILISATION &
EMBRYOLOGY 61 (1985) [hereinafter Committee of Inquiry] (citing the position that "the hu-
man embryo is seen as having the same status as a child or an adult"); see also Text of Vati-
can's Doctrinal Statement on Human Reproduction, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1987, at A14 (en-
dorsing respect for human life at its origin and respect for the act of procreation); infra notes
122-129 and accompanying text (describing trial testimony as to the status of an embryo in an
IVF disposition dispute).
25 See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA.
L. REv. 437, 444 & nn.24-25 (1990) (arguing that a "fervent minority believes that fertiliza-
tion marks the emergence of a new person.., that deserves the same rights accorded other
persons"). Robertson suggests that some of the confusion of issues may be attributable to im-
precise use of language. Further, he argues that there should be little debate over whether a
preembryo is living (it is) and, rather, the focus should be on "whether [the embryo] merit[s]
the moral protection afforded to clearly defined persons." Id. at 444 n.24; see also Elisa
Kristine Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L.
67, 69 (1990) (citing a January 1980 Joint Statement by the Archbishops of the Catholic
Church which declared that "at the time of conception there comes into existence a new life"
(citation omitted)).
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ticulate this perspective.26 Such a definition of human life suffers from two
sharp criticisms. First, it does not recognize the biological and develop-
mental differences that characterize early life.27 Second, this view is in ten-
sion with clear statements of the Supreme Court that pre-viable 28 embryos
do not possess the rights of a "person!' for purposes of the Federal Constitu-
29tion. Consequently, according to the Supreme Court view, the embryo has
no rights which would impair those of a "person" under the Constitution.
30
26 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West 1991) ("An in vitro fertilized human ovum is
a biological human being which is not the property of the physician... or the facility which
employs him or the donors of the sperm and ovum."). Although no other state has explicitly
defined preembryos as persons, others have criminalized the acts that result in their destruc-
tion. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2(3)(b) (West 1993) (criminalizing the
killing of an unborn child, defined as "any individual of the human species from fertilization
until birth").
27 See Robertson, supra note 25, at 444 & n.25 (noting the inability of the preembryo to
"interact, be conscious, have experiences, or be sentient"). In fact, a number of ethical com-
mittees accept experiments with preembryos because of the biologic determination that
preembryos have not yet developed the "primitive streak," which occurs around 14 days after
fertilization and which differentiates a preembryo from an embryo. See Kenneth J. Ryan,
Ethical and Legal Implications, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 1941, 1945-46 (defining preembryo as the fertilized egg from
conception to formation of the primitive streak); Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y,
Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILrrY 1,
29S-30S (Supp. I 1986) [hereinafter Ethical Considerations] (explaining that a preembryo is a
"genetically unique" cell mass which is not yet "developmentally individual").
28 In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court has announced a framework for rights
relating to a woman's ability to terminate her pregnancy. See infra notes 43-50 (discussing
the constitutional right to an abortion as a right to privacy). The Court has refused to recog-
nize a compelling state interest in a fetus, sufficient to override an individual's liberty or prop-
erty interests, until such time as the fetus is "viable," by which the Court means "the time at
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.,
separate opinion); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 ("[N]o case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment"). "mhe use of the word [person] is such
that it has application only postnatally." Id. This does not stand as an absolute barrier to state
regulation. It is a fundamental notion of constitutional law that a state may act whenever nec-
essary if it can demonstrate a means of action that is narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest. Under such circumstances, a state may act even at the expense of individual consti-
tutional rights. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205, 237 (1995)
(remanding for reconsideration a case involving federal contracting preferences for "'socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals' for a determination of whether interests served
were compelling and whether interests were served by a narrowly tailored means (citation
omitted)). Moreover, where fundamental rights are not affected and no suspect class is in-
volved, the State need only demonstrate that particular legislation is rationally related to a le-
gitimate state interest. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 598-603 (1987) (explaining that
where the fundamental rights of the family are not infringed, the standard of review is whether
a rational basis for a law exists).
30 For this reason, the biological distinctions between the developmental stages of early
life are less relevant Rather, the "most meaningful distinction is between extracorporeal em-
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The second ontological possibility is that the preembryo is property.
31
A property analysis focuses on the rights and interests of ownership and
control which inhere in certain interested parties, usually the donors.32 In
1984, the American Fertility Society issued a statement that "gametes and
concepti [preembryos] are the property of the donors. The donors therefore
have the right to decide at their sole discretion the disposition of these
items ... ,33 Several objections to a broad property analysis are in order.
First, this view does not resolve disputes between the individuals who do-
nated the gametes. Such a perspective may be inadequate where, for exam-
ple, property of the marriage ordinarily would be divided evenly between
the parties. 34 Second, unlike commercial goods, a frozen embryo possesses
potential for autonomous human life not subject to the property rights of al-
ienation, use, or exclusion.
A third ontological approach advocates the view that embryos are enti-
tled to special respect, permitting limited donor discretion over preembryo
disposition.35 In 1986, the American Fertility Society clarified its position
on the status of preembryos and announced that "the preembryo deserves
respect greater than that accorded to human tissue but not the respect ac-
corded to actual persons." 36 This "special respect" is derived from both the
preembryo's "potential to become a person and... [from] its symbolic
bryos... and implanted embryos." Annas, supra note 7, at 937. The critical issues here are
what rights are implicated before pregnancy and how they are to be weighed.
31 See, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (using a property
analysis to establish a bailor-bailee relationship which required the Jones Institute for Repro-
ductive Medicine to transfer custody of the Yorks' frozen preembryos to the Yorks after they
moved to California).
32 Understood broadly, property can include "every species of valuable right and interest.
More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dis-
pose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude every one else from
interfering with it." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
33 Carow, supra note 7, at 541 (quoting American Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Statement on In
Vitro Fertilization, 41 FERTILTY & STERILrrY 12, 12 (1984)).
34 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 n.6 (Tenn. 1982) (noting that such a
division would be the worst case scenario because some preembryos would be destroyed,
contrary to one party's wish, while some would be implanted, contrary to the other party's
wish,
See Robertson, supra note 7, at 972-73 (noting that the preimplantation embryo does
not deserve the respect accorded to "persons" and has legal cognizance only to the extent that
an actual person's interest in the disposition of the embryo is at stake).
36 Ethical Considerations, supra note 27, at 29S-30S; see also Protection of Human
Subjects; HEW Support of Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer. Report of the
Ethics Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,056 (1979) ("mhe human embryo is entitled
to profound respect; but this respect does not necessarily encompass the full legal and moral
rights attributed to persons.").
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meaning for many people. 37 This view is certainly the favorite among
commentators38 and accords with both state court39 and Supreme Court
precedent.
40
The special respect view seems to be the most persuasive. It recognizes
the dynamic nature of the embryo and the effect that flux has on the inter-
ests of the donors, the clinic, and the State.4 1 This view attempts to balance
both present and future, individual and social interests.
42
As explained in Part V, the special respect perspective may be the best
way to think of IVF and disposition disputes constitutionally. Although this
perspective preserves a sphere of consensual decision-making, it limits the
zone of privacy when it implicates the actual or potential rights of third par-
ties. The constitutional consideration is necessary in part because of its
relevance to privacy and procreation and in part because the Constitution
provides an enduring threshold.
B. Constitutional Rights to Privacy
In 1973, the Supreme Court recognized a woman's right to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy as an exercise of her right of privacy in matters of pro-
37 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Ethics Comm. of the Am.
Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53 FERTjLrrY
& STERmLIy 35S (Supp. 2 1990)).
38 See, e.g., Committee of Inquiry, supra note 24, § 11.17 (concluding that a human em-
bryo does not have the same legal status as a living person, but recommending that it have a
"special status"); Poole, supra note 25, at 70-71 (adopting the special respect perspective);
Ryan, supra note 27, at 1946 ("Most ethical review committees have suggested that the fer-
tilized egg, preembryo, embryo, and fetus should be respected because they are humanly de-
rived and living.").
39 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 ("We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speak-
ing, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life.").
40 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992) (observing that the state
has an interest "in the protection of potential life"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)
(noting the state's legitimate, if not compelling, interest in "the potentiality of human life").
41 The essential difficulty confronting courts is what to call a cell mass which, unlike a
spleen or liver, has the unique potential to develop into a fully sentient being and which, un-
like one sperm or one egg, is derived from two sentient beings.
42 This is not to suggest that the future and social impact of ownership is never consid-
ered. That would not be true. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 477 (Vt.
1966) (erecting a constructive trust whereby the legal title to property passed to one who, act-
ing as trustee, held it for the benefit of another); JESSE DuKEMINiER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUsTs, & ESTATES 2 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that means of devising and
passing property are created by law and "are in all respects regulated by them"). In the IVF
context, however, the future question is not "who shall have it?" but rather "who shall it be?"
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creation.43 Five years later, Louise Brown was born, the first child fertilized
ex utero.44 Thus, a right construed to limit reproduction was succeeded by a
new means of reproduction. Ironically, the right to privacy, so central to the
right to abortion,45 is now strongly implicated by the confluence of techno-
logical development and a powerful desire to bear children.46
Courts and commentators alike have evaluated IVF dispositional dis-
putes between divorced spouses by asserting that there are equal rights to
procreate and to avoid procreation.47 The impact of these rights on IVF dis-
putes is also relevant to the ability to regulate the industry.48 The contours
of the rights to privacy, procreation, abortion, and family are informative
when making decisions about the allocation of costs in IVF disputes.
Therefore, the relevant constitutional doctrines will be discussed briefly.
There is no explicit reference to rights of privacy in the Constitution.
Yet, for more than a century, Supreme Court decisions have recognized
such rights in various contexts.49
43 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-66 (summarizing the right to abortion and permissible regu-
latory considerations).
See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing the first "test-tube" baby).
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 ("The Roe Court itself placed its holding in .... the liberty
relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or
bear a child."); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
46 See Linda D. Applegarth, Emotional Implications, in 2 REPRODUCTIVE
ENDOCRINOLOGY, SURGERY, AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 1953, 1954 (noting that
fertility is central to our culture and that for many, "reproduction is a basic expectation of
life"); id. at 1961 (suggesting that "infertility patients pursue treatment with a tenacity equal to
that of cancer patients" (citations omitted)); Ann Lalos et al., Depression, Guilt and Isolation
Among Infertile Women and Their Partners, 5 J. PsYcHOsOMATIC OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 197, 197-206 (1985) (describing the essential importance, especially for
women, of the ability to conceive and give birth); Rutter, supra note 7, at 65-66 (explaining
that infertility has devastating effects on individuals because of the fundamental social nature
of reproduction); Patrick J. Taylor, When is Enough Enough?, 54 FERTILITY & STERILITY
772, 772 (1990) (describing couples' tireless efforts to conceive and unwillingness to abandon
treatment); see also supra note 7 (describing the growth of the fertility industry).
47 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600-01 (Tenn. 1992) (evaluating the right to pro-
creational autonomy as the right to procreate and the right not to procreate); Dehmel, supra
note 4, at 1402 (conceding that there are equal rights to procreate and not to procreate); Poole,
supra note 4, at 93 (suggesting the equality of the right to procreate and the right to avoid pro-
creation).
48 See Annas, supra note 7, at 937 (stating that the abortion model of privacy has "been
used to resist the regulation of assisted reproduction").
49 In 1973, Justice Blackmun stated for the Court:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of deci-
sions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific P, Co. v. Botsford, 141
U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In
varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the
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These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"... are included
in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right
has some extension to activities relating to marriage, ... procreation,...
contraception .... family relationships ... and child rearing and educa-
tion ....
As the foregoing statement illustrates, much of the Court's discussion
of the right to privacy has centered on the family. The rights of the family
have a long pedigree with the Supreme Court.51 These rights have been de-
fined in the context of formation, including consenting adults' right to
marry, divorce, and procreate; and the context of function, including the
rights to the control and companionship of children.
1. Rights of Formation: Marriage, Divorce, and Procreation
The importance of marriage has never escaped the Court's notice. Mar-
riage has been treated as a "sacred obligation... [u]pon [which] society
may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social
obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to
deal. 52 In addition, the right of marriage has been deemed so fundamental
that the opportunity to divorce and remarry may not be barred for purposes
of administrative efficiency. 53 The Constitution thus protects both the for-
roots of that right in the First Amendment, ... in the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, ... in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,... in the Ninth Amend-
ment,... or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment....
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted).
50 Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
51 See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (upholding a requirement of parental
notice when an immature, dependent minor seeks an abortion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213-14 (1972) (protecting parental control over children's religion and education); Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage and procreation as "basic
civil rights of men"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that constitution-
ally protected liberties include the right to "many, establish a home and bring up children");
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (holding that although marriage is a "sa-
cred obligation" it is also a "civil contract").
52 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding
an anti-miscegenation law violative of the Due Process Clause where the law deprived the
plaintiffs of the right to marry, "one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that
a restriction of contraceptive use by married couples violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it was "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship[,].... a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights").
53 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (holding that it is an unconstitu-
tional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to bar parties from
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mation and the dissolution of the marital relationship. Due to the funda-
mental nature of the right to marry, restrictions on the right are strictly scru-
tinized to determine whether they are "closely tailored to effectuate only
[important state] interests."
Particularly relevant in the context of family formation is the right to
procreate, announced in Skinner v. Oklahoma.5 5 Jack Skinner was prose-
cuted under an Oklahoma statute, providing that criminals convicted on two
or more occasions for crimes involving "moral turpitude" would be ren-
dered "sexually sterile. 56 The statute exempted certain crimes from cover-
age, those which might now be characterized as "white collar" offenses.
5 7
The state began proceedings to sterilize Skinner because he had been con-
victed once for stealing chickens and convicted twice for armed robbery. 8
After subjecting the statute to "strict scrutiny,, 59 the Court found that
the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court explained the need for such scrutiny because the law in-
fringed on the right to procreate, "one of the basic civil rights of man. Mar-
riage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.,
61
The link made between "marriage and procreation" is noteworthy in an
opinion that does not discuss Mr. Skinner's marital status and that does not
address whether the right of procreation may be confined to the marriage
62relationship. Notably, the Court did not vest in any one person the right,
divorce proceedings for failure to pay court costs where the parties sought a divorce in good
faith and were unable to pay court costs due to uncontested indigency).
54 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (holding that a law barring marriage
by those with delinquent child support obligations was an unconstitutional violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
5 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
56 Id. at 536-37.
57 See id. at 537 (excluding "violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzle-
ment, or political offenses" (citation omitted)).
58 See id. The Act provided for notice, an opportunity to be heard, and trial by jury. See
id. at 536. Because the Court declined to consider the procedural objection, the adequacy of
the proceedings is presumed. See id. at 538 (declining to address Skinner's due process claim
because his equal protection argument afforded an adequate remedy).
59 See id. ("[S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a state makes in a sterilization law
is essential .... ).
60 See id. at 541-42.
61 Id. at 541.
62 In a limited sense, the right of procreation has since been extended to unmarried cou-
ples-at least to the extent of a couple's right to try to prevent pregnancy and a woman's right
not to endure pregnancy as a punishment for violating a prohibition on fornication. See infra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text (explaining the rights of an unmarried couple to have ac-
cess to contraception in order to prevent pregnancy). It is not clear, however, if the right has
lost its moorings. Consider, for example, Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) and Mi-
[Vol. 147:435
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
as against another, to procreate.63 The Court feared that the Act could
"cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither
and disappear [and] ... could readily become a rule of human genetics."6
'
In sum, the Court sought to protect the individual reproductive function
against intrusion by the State, absent compelling circumstances.
6 5
chael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), both favoring marriage over biology. The Court
has not answered the question regarding whether unmarried individuals have a right to have
children. The question is squarely presented in the context of IVF custody disputes between
divorcing couples, where each party is effectively unmarried and does not yet have a child.
Rather, the Court has been confronted with the question post hoc by unmarried parties who
already have children. It is suggested in Part V that this is a distinction with a difference.
63 See Ryan, supra note 27, at 1949 ("In Skinner v. Oklahoma..., the court struck down
mandatory sterilization of habitual criminals because it interfered with the right of procrea-
t Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541-42. According to one scholar, a small study of IVF claims in
Britain (the "British study") suggests that there is a eugenic aspect to patient selection. See
Deborah Lynn Steinberg, A Most Selective Practice: The Eugenic Logics of IF, 20
WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 33, 34 (1997) (suggesting that IVF practice emphasizes conven-
tional and heterosexual notions of"fitness"). Steinberg purports to demonstrate "the ways in
which IVF selection practices can be seen to relate in direct and indirect ways to the repro-
duction of"ableist, class oppressive, heterosexist, and racist social divisions." Id at 34.
Of course, the British study is an indictment of the position taken by this Comment that
the constitutional protection of reproductive acts, not ability, is limited by the marriage and
family preferences in which the right is rooted. To that extent, this Comment and the British
study may not agree. This Comment takes no position on the validity of same-sex marriages
or of alternative family formations. Rather, this Comment, in essence, argues that the import
to one individual of becoming a biological parent does not outweigh the State's interest in
minimizing disputes and in limiting a right to those who have demonstrated a commitment to
another.
More important, perhaps, is the British study's assertion of eugenic behaviors pervading a
private, largely unregulated industry. If Skinner was concerned with the limited opportunities
of disfavored social groups, then the private and unregulated selection by fertility clinics
seems to do the same. The ability of the government to regulate such clinics, however, could
be impaired by a broad assertion that the individual right of procreation is being infringed.
Consequently, the question of whether a fundamental right is involved is of extreme impor-
tance to the ability of the government to regulate such clinical procedures. See supra notes
23, 49 (citing sources which explore the fundamental rights question with regard to regula-
tion).
65 It is difficult to imagine what those circumstances might be. For a much maligned in-
dication, see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), upholding the sterilization of a mentally
deficient woman in a state institution because "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough."
See also In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 721-24 (Mass. 1982) (noting that it was important to
protect an incompetent person's individual rights and holding that a court must look carefully
at a specified set of factors before permitting an incompetent individual to be sterilized).
Likely, Buck is no longer good law. See LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 207 (1996)
(noting that Skinner casts doubt on Buck). The trouble is not with the result, but rather with
the deferential standard applied in Buck. Compare Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (deferring to the
legislature's determination of incompetence and noting that 'we cannot say as a matter of law
that the grounds do not exist" for sterilizing those who are incompetent and who are "mani-
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Although Skinner clarified the right to be free from state intrusion into
the physical aspects of reproduction, it did not contemplate whether there
was any protection of the right to avoid procreation. That question was
raised when, bolstered by social change in the 1960s, laws regulating con-
traception were contested because they operated "directly on an intimate
relation of husband and wife.
66
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court enunciated a married couple's
right to be free of arbitrary state restrictions on access to contraceptives for
the purpose of preventing pregnancy. 67 The Court in Griswold derived the
right to contraception from the right to privacy in one's marital relations.
68
Writing for the plurality in Griswold, Justice Douglas found a right to
privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights and found that this right to
privacy encompassed consensual behavior in "the sacred precincts of mari-
tal bedrooms. '69 Justice Goldberg, writing for a three-Justice concurrence,
agreed that the "the rights to marital privacy.., are of similar order and
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected," 70 but thought
those rights to be derived from the Ninth Amendment reservation of rights
to the people.71
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,72 the Court extended the right of contraception to
unmarried individuals. 73 Writing for a three-Justice plurality, Justice Bren-
nan found that a law limiting access to contraceptives was violative of the
festly unfit for continuing their kinds"), with Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (requiring strict scrutiny
of laws that infringe upon reproduction).
66 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
67 See id. at 485-86 ("[A] 'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitu-
tionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the areas of protected freedoms."' (quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964))). The standard of review applied by the Court was unclear. The
plurality simply found the law "overbroad" with a "maximum destructive impact" on a pro-
tected liberty. Id. at 485. The concurring opinion applied strict scrutiny to the law, finding
that the law was not a necessary means to a compelling end. See id. at 497.
68 See id. at 485-86 (Douglas, J., plurality opinion) (noting that the marital relationship
lies "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees" and
characterizing the right to privacy in marriage as "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights").
69 Id. at 485.
70 Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
71 See id. at 486-87 ("The right to marital privacy ... is supported both by numerous de-
cisions of this Court... and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment."); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
72 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
73 See id. at 442.
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Equal Protection Clause, even under a deferential rational relation test.
74
Justice Brennan concluded that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 75 The breadth of the pro-
nouncement is striking. First, the right to bear a child was not presented in
Eisenstadt; there the only question was access to contraception. Second, the
individual right articulated in Eisenstadt is derived from the fundamental
effect that a denial of such a right would have on a person.76 To the extent
that a decision affects third parties, the state may have a greater interest in
the limits on decision-making power. Grounding the language in the facts,
it may be limited to matters which "fundamentally affect[] a person."
77
Whereas the decision to have children fundamentally affects at least three
people (two parents and a fetus which becomes a child) and the state, the
effects of the decision not to have children are more limited.
Despite the right of access to contraception, unwanted pregnancies still
occurred after Eisenstadt." Women seeking to terminate their pregnancies,
however, were confronted with state restrictions on access to abortions.79 In
Roe v. Wade, the Court limited the states' ability to restrict access to abor-
tion.80  The Court first explored the history of abortion laws, finding the
74 See id. at 447 (explaining that no "ground of difference ... rationally explains the dif-
ferent treatment accorded married and unmarried persons under" the Massachusetts statute).
Justice Brennan noted the possibility that the statute infringed on fundamental freedoms under
Griswold, but did not reach the question "because the law fail[ed] to satisfy even the more
lenient equal protection standard." Id. at 447 n.7; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
("IN]or shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.").
75 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).
76 See id. at 448-49 (noting that it is "unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has pre-
scribed pregnancy or the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication, which is a
misdemeanor").77 Id, at 453.
78 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) ("[C]oncerns are present
when the woman confronts the reality that, perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has
become pregnant."); LEON SPEROFF & PHILIP D. DARNEY, A CLINICAL GUIDE FOR
CONTRACEPTION 2 (1992) (inferring from the high proportion of abortions among American
women compared to abortion rates among women in other countries, the "unappreciated, but
real, problem of unintended pregnancy" in the United States); Charles F. Westoff, Unintended
Pregnancy in America and Abroad, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 254, 255 (1988) (estimating that
about half of pregnancies in the United States are unplanned).
79 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) ("[C]riminal abortion laws in effect in a
majority of States today .... generally proscrib[e] abortion or its attempt at any time during
pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life .. ").
80 See id. at 164-66 (holding that a first trimester abortion is left to the decision of a
woman and her physician, a second semester abortion may be regulated to protect maternal
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prohibitory form these laws had assumed of "recent vintage" in this coun-
try.-8  Next, the Court considered the interests of a prospective mother,82 a
fetus,83 and the State. 8' Finding that a fetus was not a "person" under the
Federal Constitution 85 and that the State could not have a compelling inter-
est in a nonviable fetus, 86 the Court held that the first three months of preg-
nancy would be controlled exclusively by the physician-patient relation-
ship.87 During that first trimester, a woman's right to "bear or beget a child"
is paramount, and she can terminate the pregnancy for any reason or no rea-
son at all, so long as she can find a doctor willing to perform the proce-
dure. The Court explained that the burdens of unwanted parenthood were
health, and a third trimester abortion may be prohibited except where necessary to protect the
life or health of the woman).
81 See id. at 129-30, 130-47 (noting that current laws derived "from statutory changes
effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century").
82 See id. at 152-56 (finding a right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment which
"includes the abortion decision"). Recall that if the Eisenstadt dictum is given full force, this
right to privacy includes the decision whether to "bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
83 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-62 (determining that a fetus was not a "person" entitled to
constitutional protection and refusing to sanction any single view of when life begins). This is
not to say that the State may not confer benefits on a fetus or give it a legal status. It is to say,
however, that when tension exists between the legal rights of a person and a fetus, those of the
person will prevail. Thus, the fetus is not a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment; men
and women are.
94 See id. at 162-64 (determining that the state interest in maternal health becomes com-
pelling at the conclusion of the first trimester because evidence demonstrates that the risk
from abortion increases as the duration of the pregnancy lengthens, and determining that the
state interest in the potential life of the fetus becomes compelling after viability when the fetus
"presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb").
85 See id. at 158 ("mhe word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn.").
86 See Id. at 163 ("With respect to the state's important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the 'compelling' point is at viability."). Viability is the point at which, with or without
assistance, the fetus is capable of survival outside the mother. See id. at 160 (defining viabil-
ity). After viability, a state may "regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id. at 165.
87 See id. ("For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion
decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician."). The holding was premised upon the relative dangers presented to a
woman during the first three months of pregnancy and the dangers of an abortion during those
same three months. See id. at 150 ("Mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions,
where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low or lower than the rates for normal child-
birth.").
88 Griswold and Eisenstadt could have stood for the proposition that couples have a right
to avoid pregnancy. Such a reading would, however, create other concerns. As an initial
matter, such an interpretation would imply punishment for wrongful acts: If one has sex, one
must deal with the consequences. In Roe, the Court noted that "no court or commentator has
taken the [deterrence] argument seriously." 410 U.S. at 148. Further, '[i]t would be plainly
unreasonable to assume that [the state] has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted
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too great to be imposed where a parent exercised the decision not to assume
that responsibility.89 In Roe, the challenge to the law was facial, not "as ap-
plied." 90 The Court did not balance the interests of specific parties in the
case. It did not suggest that the burdens on a particular woman and a par-
ticular man ought to be assessed and then evaluated.91 The Court could
have recognized the competing rights to procreation and could have prohib-
ited abortion where a particular man's interest in becoming a parent out-
weighed a particular woman's interest in not doing so. 92 Finding the effects
child... as punishment for fornication."' Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 695
(1977) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438,448 (1972)).
Moreover, such a construction would create tension between a desire to punish and the
right to contraception. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992)
(O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ., separate opinion) ("Roe's scope is confused by the fact of
its concern with postconception potential life, a concern otherwise likely to be implicated only
by some forms of contraception protected independently under Griswold...
89 The Court has noted the burdens of unwanted pregnancy.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be in-
volved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health
may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in
this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may
be involved.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
90 See id. at 120 (noting that Jane Roe "instituted this federal action" seeking "a declara-
toryjudgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face").
1 See id. at 165 n.67 ("Neither in this opinion nor in [its companion] ... do we discuss
the father's rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No pa-
rental right has been asserted... [and we] need not now decide whether [spousal consent]
provisions ... are constitutional."). The Court did address the constitutionality of a spousal
consent requirement in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976), holding that
the requirement of written spousal consent was unconstitutional in the abortion context, and
affirming that holding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). "A State may
not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children."
Id. at'898.
92 This type of approach is taken by the Davis court. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that the potential father's financial and psychological in-
terests in avoiding becoming an unwilling parent outweighed the potential mother's desire to
donate the couple's frozen, fertilized eggs to an infertile couple). Such individual balancing
would be valuable to a would-be father when a woman's physical burden of pregnancy is
minimized by the provision of good medical care and where she will be relieved of the "bur-
den" of child rearing after delivery by the father or another adoptive parent. To the extent that
these mitigating factors are in aid of the interests of a father, they are equally unpersuasive in
aid of the interests of the State, which, unlike the father in most jurisdictions, has "no affirma-
tive [duty to] aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." DeShaney v. Win-
nebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). Of course, a balancing ap-
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of unwanted pregnancy and parenthood too great to impose on a woman, the
Court declined a case-by-case inquiry in pre-viability abortions.
93
Over the years, the doctrinal defense of the right to abortion never has
been clear. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,94 the Court's most recent
analysis of the doctrinal basis of abortion rights, the Court declined to eluci-
date the source of the rights.95 Rather, the Court explained that abortion
could be protected by the right to procreation which is inherent in the right
96to privacy. Alternatively, the right to abort a pregnancy could also be
premised on the right to bodily autonomy which is itself a subset of the right
to privacy.97 Lastly, the right to freedom from interference in obtaining an
abortion could be understood as being a unique right.
98
In Casey, it was unnecessary to isolate the source of the rights at issue
because the results were the same no matter what the source. Analytical
proach in the abortion context would entail problems of proof and implementation. Those
concerns, however, go to the scope of intrusion on the privacy of each party, not to the unique
scope of a woman's right to abort.
93 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (listing many of the potential detriments imposed upon
women in the event of an unwanted pregnancy).
94 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, Roe was substantially retained but in a less structured
form. Viability remains the dividing line, with a state prohibited from unduly burdening the
right to abortion prior to that time in the absence of a compelling state interest. See id. at 846.
95 See id. at 857 ("It will be recognized, of course, that [Roe] stands at an intersection of
two lines of decisions, but in whichever doctrinal category one reads the case, the result for
present purposes will be the same.").
6 See id. at 857 ("[Roe] is clearly in no jeopardy [if based on] ... liberty relating to inti-
mate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.").
This right of privacy, however, has not precluded laws against fornication or prostitution.
Consequently, the language linking the right of procreation with the notion of family is note-
wortl-
See id. at 857 ("[Roe]... maybe... a rule... of personal autonomy and bodily integ-
rity . .. ."). Note that, in the same vein, Skinner could represent simply the right to bodily
integrity. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (explaining Skinner). However,
whether a woman's bodily integrity is implicated in the abortion context may not be disposi-
tive. For example, although a state may not compel a surrogate mother to carry her pregnancy
to term, it has been permitted, under the Fourth Amendment, to detain criminals until they
excrete previously ingested contraband. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (permitting a six-hour detention without a warrant while officers waited
for a woman to excrete 88 drug-filled balloons). The duration of such confinements and dan-
ger involved in waiting is not insignificant. See, e.g., United States v. Adekunle, 2 F.3d 559,
562 (5th Cir. 1993) (permitting a 100-hour detention, compulsory laxative use, and a moni-
tored bowel movement); United States v. Odofin, 929 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming a
24-day detention before a bowel movement). Such detention is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment and, arguably, has less social justification than does the health and welfare of a
child which is "fimdamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-
reaching and devastating effects.").
98 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 857 ("[O]ne could classify [Roe] as sui generis.").
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distinctions, however, cannot remain as obscure in other contexts. The bur-
geoning growth of IVF technologies, for example, raises questions that di-
rectly implicate only the right of procreation 99 -post-fertilization, pre-
implantation rights to decide "whether to bear or beget a child.' 00
Moreover, the fact that IVF post-fetilization, pre-implantation disputes
generally will arise in the context of divorce sharpens the focus on the rela-
tionship of marriage to the right of procreation. The connection between
privacy rights and procreation is derived from the fundamental right to mar-
riage. 101 Further, the right to procreate is related to the subject matter of
IVF-that is, children-as opposed to other arguably private behaviors such
as drug use, gambling, or prostitution. When the right of procreation has
been extended to single persons, it has been done with an emphasis on
minimizing future responsibility and harm. In short, there is a constitutional
basis for extending greater procreational rights to married persons (an ex-
ante right to have children or not) than to unmarried persons (only an ex-
ante right to decide not to have children). When consequences will not be
shared by consenting adults, the Court has demonstrated an aversion to
making one party pay the steep price of unwanted parenthood for one-time
consensual behavior.
Perhaps, however, that says too much. After all, the Court removes de-
cision-making power from even a married biological father when his wife
becomes pregnant. She alone has the authority to perpetuate or terminate
the pregnancy, apart from the father's wishes. Whether married or unmar-
ried, the Court has found that the burdens of unwanted pregnancy and par-
enthood are too great to impose on one person. 12 Moreover, a woman may
choose to carry a pregnancy to term despite the objections of the biological
father. Thus, the parenthood decision becomes irrevocable for a man at the
time of intercourse and is not irrevocable for a woman until the much later
stage of viability. In short, a combination of bodily integrity and irrevoca-
ble harm combine to divest a father of what might otherwise be his well-
developed right to procreate. It seems harder to justify preference for non-
marital children in the face of one potential parent's opposition, even where
no bodily integrity concerns arise. In the IVF context, no impending and
irrevocable pregnancy forecloses the fundamentally life-altering decision
99 The right of bodily autonomy is not implicated by extra-corporeal embryos. Nor does
history support IVF as its own right.
100 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
102 See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (explaining that, in the case of an ex-
tant pregnancy, the more direct harm inheres to the woman and that a state may not give a
man power that the state itself does not possess-the power to force pregnancy and birth).
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regarding whether or not to bear a child. In fact, unwanted parenthood out-
side of marriage is still a burden which ought not be imposed. 103
2. Rights of Function: Control and Companionship of Children
The preceding discussion centered on the rights of consenting adults to
marry, to divorce, and to control certain procreative decisions. There is also
a line of cases that deals more particularly with the rights and duties of par-
ents in their relations with their children.
The Court has observed, and reiterated, that "'the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor
hinder."' 1°4 In several cases, for example, the Court has recognized a par-
ent's right to resist the standardizing effect of a public school education on
his or her children.
105
Also derived from the rights of the family are the rights of unwed, bio-
logical fathers to block the adoptions of their genetic offspring. 1 6 In short,
103 The importance of genetic connection, demonstrated by the large enrollment at IVF
clinics, should not be denied. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-
Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1747, 1778 (1993). Parents
separated from known children experience a loss of connection and development. See
MIRIAM GALPER COHEN, LONG-DIsTANCE PARENTING 21 (1989) ("Without that connection,
both parents and children fail to develop a part of themselves."). "After divorce then the
structures which integrate the diverse aspirations of parents into a coherent and workable
whole are at best problematic .... This process is inevitably a painful one, touching as it
does on fundamentals of identity and emotion." BOB SIMPSON, CHANGING FAMILIES: AN
ETI-NOGRAPHic APPROACH TO DIvORCE AND SEPARATION 75 (1998); see also id. at 52-53
(explaining vitriolic divorce as derived, in part, from parental self-identification with "future
identity of offspring"). It has been shown that birth parents who surrender a child for adop-
tion experience "posttraumatic stress" during an often isolated and extended grieving period.
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (citing studies regarding parental loss);
JOYCE MAGUIRE PAvAO, THE FAMILY OF ADOPTION 10 (1998) ("Many birth parents spend
the early period, after the surrender, as do people who have other kinds of posttraumatic
stress."). Other commentators have identified the extreme stress occassioned by the pressures
of unwanted children outside of marriage. See Dehmel, supra note 4, at 1402 (describing psy-
chological burdens); Robertson, supra note 25, at 479 (suggesting psychological loss).
'04 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
105 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a
state law which made it a criminal offense to fail to send one's children to school until the age
of sixteen as applied to the Old Order Amish, whose rights to free exercise of religion would
be violated if their children were sent to public school in accordance with the law); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (recognizing the right of an individual to receive in-
struction in a modem, foreign language and holding that a law which denied that right was
contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
106 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibited a statute giving an unwed, biological mother the right to block adoption
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the cases acknowledge the importance of biological ties, but require more:
an unwed father must demonstrate "a full commitment to parenthood by de-
veloping a complete and permanent relationship with his child."'10 7 The Su-
preme Court has recognized that a state may extend rights to married fathers
that it does not extend to unmarried fathers, on the assumption that married
fathers explicitly incur obligations to a child, while unmarried fathers do
not.108 Biology, then, is of secondary import to social relationship. Courts
by withholding consent but extending no similar protection to an unwed father who had dem-
onstrated a paternal interest in the child); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1972)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
terminating the parental rights of an unwed, biological parent without notice and a hearing).
But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-32 (1989) (holding that a law establishing
a presumption that a child born to a married woman is a child of the marriage, which may be
rebutted only by the husband or wife but not the putative biological father, was a reasonable
means of supporting the marital relation and did not infringe the due process rights of either
the unwed, biological father or the child); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-63, 267-68
(1983) (holding that an adoption by a biological mother and her husband, without notice to the
biological father, was not unconstitutional under either the Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses where the biological father had asserted almost no parental interest in the child);
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56 (holding that neither due process nor equal protection was vio-
lated by a statute requiring only the biological mother's consent to the adoption of a child
born out of wedlock, where the biological father had made no attempt to obtain actual or legal
custody for 11 years and where adoption was in the best interests of the child).
107 Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Rights of Unwed Father to Obstruct Adoption of His
Child by Withholding Consent, 61 A.L.R. 5TH 151, 178 (1998); see also id. at 178-80 (sum-
marizing Lehr, 463 U.S. 248; Caban, 441 U.S. 380; Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246; and Stanley, 405
U.S. 645). Campbell notes that courts generally hold that where a relationship exists between
a father and a child, the father has the right to refuse consent to the child's adoption. See id. at
180. Campbell further notes that courts split as to the importance of a father's pre-birth as-
sistance to a mother and fetus, some courts finding it irrelevant to the issue of the father's con-
sent and others finding it a prerequisite to his right of refusal. See id. at 178.
Distinguishing IVF custody disputes, of course, requires no more than realizing that all
prior case law addresses these questions only in the context of viable, ongoing pregnancies.
Further, IVF disputes pose an interesting question as to the importance of "support": in the
custody disputes, the parties are divorcing. Presumably, they ought not be compelled to be
together. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (holding that due process pro-
hibits a state from denying access to a divorce on the basis of inability to pay court fees and
costs). The requirement of support, however, would require continued interaction. Moreover,
if a couple contracted for a man to keep the cryopreserved preembryos, would his ex-wife
have a duty to support him or the woman-whether new wife, girlfriend, or surrogate-who
carried the genetic material, half of which was the ex-wife's? It is anomolous to translate a
doctrine developed to accommodate extant pregnancies and family rights to a situation where
no one is pregnant and the family is dissolving.
108 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (holding that a father who made no effort to seek cus-
tody of his child or to legitimate the child over an 11-year period was not deprived of due pro-
cess or equal protection when the child was adopted without his consent). As explained, un-
married fathers may preserve their rights by acting like fathers. Married fathers are presumed
to act like fathers, having assumed the responsibilities of marriage and parenthood. In Lehr,
463 U.S. at 267-68, the Court upheld a New York statute which guaranteed notice and the
right to veto an adoption to all unwed mothers, but only to those unwed putative fathers who
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favor parents who assume responsibility within the state-sanctioned and sa-
cred confines of marriage. Read one way, these decisions could support the
right to implant the embryo: the State would be rewarding the parent who
sought custody and responsibility. The critical distinction, however, is that
prior cases of custody and control arose in the context of an existing con-
stitutional person-a child. The question becomes whether IVF disputes
look more like the necessary adjudication of parental rights and responsi-
bilities attendant to the irrevocable fact of a constitutional person (a child)
or look more like decisions of single individuals to avoid the emotional, fi-
nancial, and social harms of unwanted parenthood.
Having articulated a privacy preference for marriage and a limit on bi-
ology drawn by consequences, the IVF disputes present an unmarried cou-
ple with a nonviable embryo outside the body.
III. iVF CUSTODY BATTLES
IVF makes pregnancy possible where intercourse does not. Further,
cryopreservation of preembryos enables a delay between the decision to
fertilize an egg and the time of implantation of the egg. Also, the potential
for life inherent in a preembryo generally entitles it to more consideration
than property, but less than a constitutional "person." Finally, the Constitu-
tion, under the rubrics of privacy and family, protects the rights of procrea-
tion and parenthood, particularly within the marital relationship.
Two state courts of last resort have taken notice of these legal doctrines
within the factual context of custody disputes over frozen preembryos.
10 9
The following sections present those cases to facilitate analysis of custody
disputes generally.
A. Custody in General: Davis v. Davis"
0
Mary Sue and Junior Lewis Davis met and married while both were in
the Army."' After a series of painful and dangerous tubal pregnancies
forced Mary Sue to have both her fallopian tubes ligated, the couple tried to
registered with the state. The Court reasoned that the disparate treatment of the different par-
ents was fairly based on their different levels of commitment to the child, and that the state
had provided a reasonable means for unwed putative fathers to safeguard their rights. See id.
at 264-67.
109 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (involving a custody dispute between a
divorcing couple over their frozen embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)
(same).
'10 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), affg No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
13, 1990), rev'g No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989).
"I Seeid. at591.
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adopt.112 A change of heart by the birthmother in one instance, 13 and the
prohibitive cost of adoption in others, 114 left the Davises unable to become
parents by adoption. Desiring still to become parents, the couple pursued
IVF115 The process was painful and demanding for Mary Sue: each im-
plantation required the aspiration of eggs, with the attendant anesthesia, in-
jections, and testing.!
16
After some time, cryopreservation became available and the burden of
the aspirations was reduced, since multiple eggs could be aspirated and
saved for later implantation. 117 In one aspiration, Mary Sue produced nine
eggs, which were then fertilized with Junior's sperm. 118 Several were im-
planted, and the rest were cryopreserved for future use.1 9 The first im-
plantation failed to result in pregnancy, and, shortly thereafter, Junior filed
for divorce. The issue dividing the couple in the proceedings was the
disposition of the fertilized embryos.
21
At trial, the judge heard testimony that "human life begins at the
moment of conception." 122  Finding that the cryopreserved preembryos
were "children in vitro," 123 the court concluded that it was in the best
interest 124 of the "children" to be bom, rather than destroyed in vitro.
1 25
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id. ("In vitro fertilization became essentially the only option for the Davises to
pursue in their attempt to become parents.").
116 The court related the facts:
Despite her fear of needles ... Mary Sue underwent the month of subcutaneous in-
jections... and the eight days of intermuscular injections .... She was anesthetized
five times for the aspiration procedure .... Forty-eight to [seventy-two] hours after
each aspiration, she returned for transfer back to her uterus, only to receive a nega-
tive pregnancy test result each time.
Id. at 591-92.
117 See id. at 592.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 594 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a French geneticist).
123 Id.
124 The "best interest" analysis is standard in custody disputes between biological parents
seeking custody in a divorce proceeding. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 65, at 589 (noting
the legal development by which the "best interests of the child become a judicial yardstick
used to measure all claims for children" (internal quotations omitted)); Ebrahim J. Kermani,
Issues of Child Custody and Our Moral Values in the Era of New Medical Technology, 31 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PsYCHIATRY 533, 533 (1992) (noting that the best interest
of the child "still plays an essential role in the settlement of custody disputes").
125 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594.
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Mary Sue sought to implant the preembryos in herself and was awarded
custody. 126
The intermediate appellate court rejected the notion that life begins at
conception. 127 The court applied an implicit property analysis and granted
joint custody to Mary Sue and Junior Davis. 12  That decision was appealed,
and the Supreme Court of Tennessee agreed to decide the matter. Mean-
while, Mary Sue remarried and no longer sought custody for herself, but
rather, sought custody so that she might donate the preembryos to another
couple.
129
The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the preembryos occupied
"an interim category [between person and property] that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life. '130 The court said
that any agreement between the Davises regarding disposition in the event
of disagreement would have been presumed valid.131 In the absence of such
an agreement, however, the court declined to "decide [the] case on the basis
of implied contract or the reliance doctrine."' 32 Rather, the court balanced
two competing constitutional interests that it found within the right to pri-
vacy: 133 the right to procreate and the right not to procreate.
134
The court balanced Junior's expected financial and unique psychologi-
cal burdens 135 if forced to become an unwilling parent against Mary Sue's
126 See id.
127 See id. (stating that "[t]he Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the trial judge's rea-
soning, as well as the result" and that "the argument that 'human life begins at the moment of
conception"' had "been abandoned by the appellant, despite her success with it in the trial
court" (footnote omitted)).
128 See id. at 595-96.
129 See id. at 590.
130 Id. at 597; see supra Part II.A (discussing the possibile classifications for a preembryo
from which the court could choose).
131 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 ("[Ain agreement regarding disposition of any untrans-
ferred preembryos in the event of contingencies ... should be presumed valid and should be
enforced as between the progenitors.").
132 Id. at 598 (footnote omitted).
133 See id. ("[T]he essential dispute here is not where or how or how long to store the
preembryos, but whether the parties will become parents.... [T]he answer to this dilemma
turns on the parties' exercise of their constitutional right to privacy.").
134 See id. at 600-01 (holding that, under the state constitution, the right to privacy en-
compasses the right to procreation, and analyzing federal cases to demonstrate that "procrea-
tional autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and
the right to avoid procreation").
135 See id. at 603-04 ("Junior Davis testified that, as a boy, he had severe problems
caused by separation from his parents.... In light of his boyhood experiences, [he] is vehe-
mently opposed to fathering a child that would not live with both parents.").
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desire to donate the eggs to an infertile couple.1 36 The court held that Jun-
ior's interests weighed more heavily.1 37 The court articulated a three-part
inquiry for resolving disputes over the disposition of frozen preembryos.
First, a court should honor the "preferences of the progenitors. 138 Second,
where unclear, the court should give effect to the prior agreement of the
parties. 39  Finally, and absent prior agreement or preference, the court
should weigh the relative interests of the parties with the understanding that
"the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than use of the preembryos in question .... But, the rule does not
contemplate the creation of an automatic veto ..."140
The Davis court noted that it would have confronted a closer case "if
Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use the preembryos herself... [because]
she could not achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means."141 That
closer case arose several years later in the state of New York.
B. A Closer Case: Kass v. Kass
142
In 1993, Maureen Kass sought custody of five fertilized, cryopreserved
pre-zygotes 143 that remained from IVF procedures that she and her husband,
136 See id. at 604 ("Refusal to permit donation ... would impose on her the burden of
knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and that the preembryos
to which she contributed genetic material would never become children.").
137 See id. ("Donation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice-his procreational
autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited.").
138 Id. To avoid redundancy with the second prong, the "preference of the progenitors"
must mean the preference of the parties at the time of divorce. That understanding, however,
does not seem well suited to custody battles where the fact of the dispute indicates the lack of
a present agreement. Moreover, effecting the preference of the progenitors may not conclu-
sively resolve the ultimate question of custody of a resulting child. See infra Part IV.
139 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 ("If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is
dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out.").
14 Id. It is noteworthy that if the parties ever had agreed, even years past and under dif-
ferent circumstances, then the court would not weigh the parties' present interests. See id. at
597 ("[The parties' initial informed consent to IVF procedures will often not be truly in-
formed because of... all the turns that events may take... [b]ut, in absence of... [agreed
upon] modification[s], we conclude that their prior agreement should be considered bind-
ing.").
141 Id. at 604.
142 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998), affg 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997), rev'g No.
19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (unpublished opinion).
143 The court adopted the terms used in the agreement signed by the couple without in-
quiring into the biological accuracy of the terms. For simplicity, the term "pre-zygote" is used
here as well. There is, of course, a biological difference between a zygote, which is the one-
celled stage after the sperm fertilizes the egg but before cell division, and a preembryo, which
encompasses the early cell division, lasting approximately fourteen days after fertilization.
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Steven, had undergone. 144 For three years following her 1988 marriage,
Maureen Kass underwent aspiration five times and unsuccessful implanta-
tion nine times. 145 In May 1993, the Kasses attempted to implant their pre-
zygotes into Maureen's sister, who agreed to carry a resulting pregnancy to
term on behalf of the couple. 146 The implantation did not result in a preg-
nancy. Subsequently, the couple prepared a document for an uncontested
divorce.147 The document provided for the disposition of the five remaining
pre-zygotes according to an informed consent document that the parties had
signed upon enrollment in an IVF program. 148 Three weeks later, however,
Maureen communicated her opposition to the destruction of the pre-
zygotes. 149 Steven, on the other hand, sought to have the pre-zygotes do-
nated to science, not wanting to become a parent outside of marriage.
150
At trial, the judge found that the informed consent document controlled
disposition only to the extent that it provided that in the event of divorce,
"distribution would be subject to the directives of the divorce court."''1  The
trial court held that a woman's procreative rights with respect to cryopre-
served pre-zygotes were the same as her rights with respect to a nonviable
fetus in utero, and that the woman's rights were exclusive of the man's
rights. 152 The trial court granted exclusive custody and rights to Maureen
Kass. 153 The judgment was stayed pending appeal.1
5 4
A divided intermediate appellate court reversed. 155 The five appellate
judges agreed on two propositions. First, they concluded that "[a] woman's
established right to exercise virtually exclusive control over her own body is
See Veeck, supra note 16, at 2355 (providing definitions of several terms, including "prezy-
gote" and "zygote").
144 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177.
145 See id. at 175-76. To be clear, this means that Maureen Kass experienced surgical
intrusion on 14 occasions and nine failed pregnancy attempts within a three-year period of
time.
146 See id. at 177.
147 See id.
149 See id. (stating that the disposition of the pre-zygotes according to the informed con-
sent form was donation to research and that "neither Maureen Kass[,] Steve Kass or anyone
else will lay claim to custody of these pre-zygotes").
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995)
(unpublished opinion), rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581,585 (App. Div. 1997), affd, 696 N.E.2d 174.
152 See id. at *3 (observing that for "in vitro fertilizations the right of the wife must be
considered paramount and her wishes with respect to disposition must prevail").
153 See id. at *5.
154 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 585.
155 See id. at 590.
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not implicated... until... implantation actually occurs."156  Second, the
court unanimously concluded that "the first... inquiry should be directed at
whether the parties have made an expression of mutual intent which governs
the disposition of the pre-zygotes under the circumstances in which the par-
ties find themselves. 157
The plurality found that the informed consent document was evidence
of the parties' intent to donate the pre-zygotes for research if they were un-
able to agree. 58 The plurality also found the consent document to be dis-
positive because the case involved "intensely personal and essentially pri-
vate matters which are appropriately resolved by the prospective parents
rather than the courts." 159 The concurring judge stated that the informed
consent document was ambiguous as to the disposition of the pre-zygotes in
the event of the parties' disagreement. The concurring opinion asserted
that "the objecting party, except in the most exceptional circumstances,
should be able to veto a former spouse's proposed implantation." 161 The
concurring judge did not think that Maureen Kass had proved such excep-
tional circumstances. 162 Two dissenting judges agreed with the concurring
opinion in that the informed consent document was not a clear statement of
the parties' intent.163 The dissent would have remanded the case to the trial
court for an inquiry into the interests, positions, and burdens of the par-
ties."6
The New York Court of Appeals, the state's high court, affirmed 161 the
plurality holding. The court first held that a woman's rights of privacy and
156 Id. at 586 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992)).
157 Id.
158 See id. at 587.
159 Id. at 590.
160 See id. at 592 (Friedman, J., concurring) ("T]he lVF contract before us is susceptible
of multiple and conflicting interpretations, with the result that, in my opinion, it cannot logi-
cally be relied upon to resolve the instant dispute.").
161 Id. (Friedman, J., concurring)
162 See id. at 593-94 (Friedman, J., concurring) ("ITihe plaintiff has effectively proven on
the instant record that she could not make the necessary showing of exigency even if she were
afforded the opportunity.').
163 See id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting) (disputing the plurality's contention that the
"agreement in issue, by any stretch of the imagination, reflects the intent of these parties to
destroy their pre-zygotes in the event of divorce").
164 See id. at 599-602 (relying on the assertion of the Davis court that an analysis should
"consider the positions of the parties, the significance of their interests and the relative bur-
dens that will be imposed by differing resolutions" (quoting Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
603 (Tenn. 1992))).
165 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998), affg 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1997).
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bodily integrity were not implicated in the dispute over the pre-zygotes.
166
Further, the court observed that the pre-zygotes were not "persons" in the
constitutional sense. 167 The court suggested that "[a]greements between
progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes
should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dis-
pute between them.' 168 Analysis of the agreement led the court to conclude
that the agreement was clear and dispositive-the pre-zygotes would be do-
nated to research if the parties could not otherwise agree.
169
C. After Davis and Kass: What Next?
Both the Kass and Davis courts suggested that, due to the intimate na-
ture of the subject matter and the deference to privacy in matters of pro-
creation, private disposition agreements would be enforced. The Kass court
unanimously construed a document to be unambiguous, the same document
sharply dividing five judges at the intermediate appellate level.170  The
Davis court, in the absence of a preferred prior agreement or contract, con-
ducted an inquiry into the rights and interests of the parties. 17 1 Both courts
ordered judgment for the party opposing implantation.
Three questions arise from these two decisions. First, should prior
agreements by the parties be given legal effect when- the parties divorce or
disagree? Second, if prior agreements are unenforceable, either as a matter
of law or construction, how should the disposition determination be made?
Third, does the right to procreate shed any light on the legal rights of the
parties in IVF custody disputes? The following Parts address these ques-
tions in turn.
IV. DEFERENCE TO CONTRACT OR INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENTS
The Davis and Kass courts agreed that the intent of the parties, as ex-
pressed in either a contract or an informed consent agreement, should con-
166 See id. at 179.
167 See id.
168 Id. at 180 (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597).
169 See id. at 180-82 (applying "common-law principles governing contract interpreta-
tion").
170 See supra notes 155-69 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of the five
appellate judges as well as the New York Court of Appeals affirmation of the intermediate
appellate court's plurality opinion, which found the consent document to be unambiguous).
171 See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing test under-
taken by the Davis court to decide which of the parties would prevail).
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trol the disposition of unimplanted, fertilized eggs. For a variety of rea-
sons, this Comment argues that such deference is inappropriate in the con-
text of IVF.
A. Psychological Barriers to Contract
The delicate subject matter of a prior IVF agreement-children and
parenthood-and the psychological barriers to rational thinking about these
matters in the IVF context, likely will cause the contract to be nonrepresen-
tative of the parties' intent.173 "[I]nfertility patients pursue treatment with a
tenacity equal to that of cancer patients .... The need to pursue and suc-
ceed in treatment can therefore be powerful and profound .... ,4 Infertil-
ity can place an enormous degree of stress on individuals and their mar-
riages.175 The pressures and expectations involved often mean that a couple
will not make decisions in their usual and customary way. 7 6 Still another
172 See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 (stat-
ing in dicta that "an agreement regarding disposition of any ... preembryos in the event of
contingencies... should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progeni-
tors').
See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 ("mhe parties' initial 'informed consent' to IVF pro-
cedures will often not be truly informed because of the near impossibility of anticipating,
emotionally and psychologically, all the turns that events may take . . . "); Applegarth, supra
note 46, at 1958 ("[Many couples are ill prepared to cope with the uncertainties, fears, and
potential losses that infertility entails."); Daar, supra note 11, at 629 ("Psychological stud-
ies... suggest that even with accurate disclosure, patients may not understand the information
provided or its implications." (citing Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians' Conflicts of Interest." The
Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (1989))); Maranto, supra note
7, at 18 (discussing a practitioner's observation that couples do not know how they will feel
about these matters); Robertson, supra note 25, at 475 ("Because so many contingencies could
intervene to change original plans, creation of embryos alone should not be taken as an irrevo-
cable commitment to reproduction.").
174 Applegarth, supra note 46, at 1961 (citation omitted). "[A] unique, dichotomous psy-
chological profile" has also been observed among those seeking treatment: they combine a
high degree of information regarding the technical aspects of fertility treatment with an unre-
alistically high expectation of success. See Daar, supra note 11, at 629 & nn.110-12.
17s See Applegarth, supra note 46, at 1954-62 (describing the emotional response to in-
fertility in individuals and couples); Rutter, supra note 7, at 70 ("[T]echnofertility can create
such stress in a couple that it can come close to undoing their relationship-the raison d'atre
for baby-making.").
176 "For many patients and their partners, infertility becomes a part of every waking mo-
ment. It dictates decisions .... In effect, many patients often describe themselves as feeling
'stuck' or as seeing their lives as out of balance and out of control." Applegarth, supra note
46, at 1955. This "stuck" feeling may make a couple overly susceptible to cooperating with
an infertility facility, abiding by its policies even though the couple has doubts:
[Flear [of being told to leave a facility and give up] may lead to extreme compliance
on the part of the patients.... [C]ompliance may contribute to a feeling of being
victimized or misunderstood by the physician and medical support staff. As treat-
ment continues, patients sometimes begin to feel less and less a part of the decision-
1998]
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barrier to the parties coming to a real agreement on the issues is the com-
munication gap that often arises when a couple is confronting infertility.
177
In fact, the zealous pursuit of IVF may mask and exacerbate underlying
marital discord.
178
A strong argument has been made that, due to similar cognitive disso-
nance and psychological resistance, prenuptial agreements are inherently
suspect.179  Despite this argument, states clearly prefer private ordering
within the marriage relationship and at the time of divorce. 80  Conse-
making process.
Id. at 1961; see also Rutter, supra note 7, at 67-68 (explaining that, in the infertility context,
technical considerations tend to dominate couples' decision-making processes and that cou-
ples often lose focus on everything else in life).
177 Applegarth suggests that "gender-specific responses to infertility... may at times
undermine the intimacy and emotional bond that most couples experience." Applegarth, su-
pra note 46, at 1957. She further suggests that partners may feel "isolated from one another"
and may experience "periods in which [they are] unable to work through differences with re-
spect to treatment decisions." 1d.; see also Rutter, supra note 7, at 66 (describing both the
typical male and female responses as isolation enhanced by an inability to share feelings). In
this light, the assumption that any agreement represents a "meeting of the minds" of the cou-
ple is highly suspect.
178 It is possible that couples seeking fertility treatment have a higher likelihood of dis-
solution, as infertility reinforces marital discord and marital discord leads to desperate expec-
tations from fertility treatment. Compare Panitch, supra note 8, at 546 & n.24 ("These cou-
ples often find the inability to bear children to be a great and powerful loss, causing 'isolation,
guilt, marital strife, and intense assaults on feelings of self-worth."' (quoting Robertson, su-
pra note 7, at 945)), with Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592 (noting that Junior Davis "testified that he
had known that their marriage 'was not very stable' for a year or more, but had hoped that the
birth of a child would improve their relationship"). See generally Applegarth, supra note 46,
at 1954-67 (detailing the complex interrelationship between infertility, social structure, and
social response and advocating a more sophisticated role for counselors).
There is some evidence that "infertile couples going for fertility treatment tend to have
higher rates of marital satisfaction than the rest of the population." Rutter, supra note 7, at 67.
This evidence is not responsive to the concerns of this Comment. The question is not how to
handle couples who agree or whose marriages survive. Rather, it is what to do when they dis-
agree and divorce. As the director of the study discussed above acknowledges, what is im-
portant is whether, independently, the couple has the "skills to address their problem"-infer-
tility and its disappointments. Id.
1 See Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 135 & nn.34-36 (1993) (explaining that people
irrationally expect marriage to last forever). This unrealistic expectation is similar to the cog-
nitive dissonance exhibited by IVF participants. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying
text (discussing the extreme mental stress experienced by individuals and couples undergoing
infertility treatment and its effect on their decision-making ability); see also Allison A. Mar-
ston, Note, Planningfor Love: The Politics of PrenuptialAgreements, 49 STAN. L. REv. 887,
900-01 & nn.104-06 (1997) (discussing a study which revealed a "significant discrepancy
between what most couples know about divorce and what they think their chances are of get-
ting divorced").
180 See Marston, supra note 179, at 898 & nn.83-84 (explaining that "prenuptial agree-
ments that include divorce provisions are now generally enforceable in all states"); id. at 903
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quently, in modem jurisprudence, prenuptial agreements generally are en-
forceable with respect to property allocation and maintenance decrees de-
spite cognitive dissonance.1 Further, a number of courts have pointed to
"no-fault" divorce statutes as evidence that public policy recognizes that di-
vorce is a reality which prospective spouses ought to anticipate and for
which they may contract.
18 2
Because, however, prenuptial agreements generally are not binding with
respect to custody or support obligations to children, 8 3 their enforceability
is less relevant to IVF disputes, in which potential children are the source of
disagreement. The difference rightly has been characterized by other com-
mentators as essential.184
& nn.121-22 (explaining the trend towards a state preference for contract as part of a larger
trend in family law "from public to private ordering of behavior" and suggesting even more
broadly that contract replaces status in an era of social upheaval). But see Atwood, supra note
179, at 154 (arguing that the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act policy, which favors strict
enforcement of prenuptial agreements, is more likely to disadvantage women than men).
181 See Robert Roy, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to Validity of Premarital
Agreements Contemplating Divorce or Separation, 53 A.L.R. 4TH 22, 29 (1987) (explaining
that "a majority of the states recently addressing the issue, whether by judicial decision or by
legislation as revealed in reported cases, no longer hold such agreements inherently void, in-
validating only those agreements found defective in execution or result"); see also Gant v.
Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (NV. Va. 1985) (holding that premarital agreements regarding prop-
erty and spousal support are not inherently void and giving effect to a contract between a cou-
ple who, each having been married once, might not have married again in the absence of the
ability to structure their expectations); UNIF. MARrrAL PROP. ACT §§ 3, 10, 9A U.L.A. 115,
131 (1998) (setting out rules to govern marital property agreements); UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DivoRcE ACT § 307 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 288 (1998) (recommending that courts
should take into consideration any antenuptial agreements when deciding apportionment of
resources).
182 See Roy, supra note 181, at 52-55 (summarizing several cases and noting that shifts in
public policy regarding divorce influenced the reversal of judicial disfavor of premarital
agreements contemplating divorce).
183 See, e.g., Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945-46 (Ky. 1990) (holding that
prenuptial agreements in contemplation of divorce are valid where they are formed with full
disclosure, *here they are not unconscionable at the time of enforcement, and where they are
applicable only to property and maintenance); Campbell v. Moore, 1 S.E.2d 784, 793-96 (S.C.
1939) (confirming that a premarital agreement, which limited a prospective husband's support
of his child, violated public policy because society has an interest in the fulfillment of the
child support obligation); Gant, 329 S.E.2d at 116 (holding that, although premarital agree-
ments settling property and spousal support rights in the event of divorce are presumptively
valid, the birth of children is a factor a court would consider in deciding whether to enforce
such an agreement); Atwood, supra note 179, at 151 (noting that in the case of separation
agreements, provisions relating to "child support, custody, or visitation remain subject to judi-
cial scrutiny under a reasonableness standard").
184 See Annas, supra note 7, at 936 ("[No court has ever forced any person to fulfill the
terms of a surrogate-mother contract, a custody contract, or a marriage contract by requiring
that the parties be bound regardless of their current wishes or the best interests of the children
involved."); Ellen M. Moskowitz, Some Things Don't Belong in Contracts, NAT'L L.J., June
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468 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANL4 LAW REVIEW
State adoption law is also helpful in determining the legal rules sur-
rounding IVF disposition disputes. The general rule is that when a natural
parent consents to the adoption of his or her biological child, all rights of the
natural parent are terminated.' Nonetheless, a pre-birth consent to adop-
tion is not binding in many states.186 The concern underlying such a policy
seems less one of the child's best interest or concern for repose and more
one animated by a belief that, until holding a child, a waiver of parental
rights cannot be knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. These concerns underly
contracts in the IVF context. "When they undertake IVF, couples cannot
reasonably be expected to know how they will feel about their embryos
down the line."
187
There is consistency here. First, contracts regarding future children
generally are not binding. Second, agreements about the future care of chil-
dren generally are not binding. Third, once an adoption is finalized, it gen-
erally is binding but less often so where one former spouse disputes the
8, 1998, at A25 ("Child custody agreements depend on court review and approval .... Ante-
nuptial agreements are enforceable, but not with respect to reproduction.").
185 See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Natural Parent's Parental Rights As Affected
by Consent to Child's Adoption by Other Natural Parent, 37 A.L.R. 4TH 724, 725-26 (1985)
("The weight of authority to [terminate all rights of the natural parent upon consenting to have
his or her child adopted] is so overwhelming that a collection of individual case citations in
support thereof would be wasteful and uninformative.").
In several cases, however, courts read the relevant statutes to create an exception for cases
in which one natural parent adopted the child with the consent of the other natural parent. See
id. at 726 (noting that a few courts, in "exceptional circumstances," have found that a natural
parent's consent to the adoption by the other natural parent did not terminate all of the paren-
tal rights of the first parent). Cases cited explain that those exceptional circumstances involve
possible fraud and legal malpractice, see In re Jessica W., 453 A.2d 1297, 1300-01 (N.H.
1982) (holding that if a natural mother can show that she permitted an adoption by the natural
father based on the father's material misrepresentations and an attorney's ethical violations,
then the natural mother may retain parental rights despite the absence of a statutory exception
for fraud in the relevant statute), circumstances where one party was unable legally to marry
the other, see In re Adoption of a Child by A.R., 378 A.2d 87, 89-90 (N.J. Union County Ct.
1977) (finding that since the purpose of the adoption was simply so that the child of a legally
incompetent natural mother could inherit from the natural father, the adoption by the natural
father did not terminate the natural mother's rights), and circumstances where parents who
agreed that "marriage would be harmful" deliberately conceived out of wedlock, see In re
A.J.J., 438 N.Y.S.2d 444, 445 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (finding that an adoption by the natural father
making the child his legitimate heir, while still allowing the mother to retain her parental
rights, was permissible in order to serve the best interests of the child).
186 See Moskowitz, supra note 184, at A25 ("A pre-birth decision to surrender a child for
adoption is unenforceable."); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 65, at 1173 (explaining that
some states bar consent to adopt before birth and that some impose statutory time limits after
birth).
b7 See Maranto, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining that a couple's informed consent to stor-
ing embryos for only a limited period of time may really be something less because of unfore-
seen emotional attachment).
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other. Underlying these rules is an awareness of the magnitude of the par-
enthood decision, the interests of an independent third party (the child), and
the interests of the State in repose.
B. Social Obstacles to Contract
Even if the psychological barriers to contract are surmounted, there still
exist social considerations which counsel against favoring contract in the
IVF context.
First, the effect of state child custody laws may be to undo decisions
which uphold contracts that favor implantation. That is, a contract may as-
sign one parent custody of the embryos. If implanted successfully, how-
ever, the noncustodial donor will potentially complicate actual child cus-
tody.
A brief overview of state laws will clarify this point. With respect to
custody decisions, the wishes of natural parents often are given considerable
weight. 88 Contracts between spouses concerning custody of their children,
however, generally are not binding on courts, although courts may give such
contracts effect if they are consistent with the best interests of the child. i 9
The claims of a biological, noncustodial parent may weigh less heavily,
however, when the biological mother is married to the man seeking parental
rights despite the fact that he is not the adoptive father or the biological fa-
ther, because courts prefer to uphold the marital union.
190
188 See Alan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights of Man Who Is Not Biological or
Adoptive Father of Child but Was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When Child Was Con-
ceived or Born, 84 A.L.R. 4TH 655, 659-62 (1991 & Supp. 1998) (summarizing the case law
regarding the parental rights of nonbiological fathers).
189 See Atwood, supra note 179, at 143 n.77 (noting that both at common law and under
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, courts decline per se enforcement of custody and
support contracts, preferring, in general, a "best interests of the child" analysis). In the IVF
context, however, a best interests analysis may be inappropriate because there is no child, or
constitutional "person." An exception for contract terms in support of children is notable un-
der a uniform regime which exhibits a strong preference for contract. See Annotation, Court's
Power to Modify Child Custody Order As Affected by Agreement Which Was Incorporated in
Divorce Decree, 73 A.L.R1 2D 1444, 1444 n.3 (1960) (stating the general rule that inter-
spouse contracts regarding the custody of their children are not binding on courts). "The most
commonly appearing kinds of rationale are that the welfare of the child transcends any agree-
ment of the parties, and that custody agreements are not in the nature of property settlements."
Id. at 1447 (Supp. 1997); see also Doyle v. McLoughlin, 536 N.Y.S.2d 918, 920 (App. Div.
1989) (recognizing that a custody agreement is not controlling on a court).
190 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-32 (1989) (upholding a law which
denied a putative natural father the right to challenge the paternity of a natural mother's hus-
band); John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1384-88 (Pa. 1990) (holding that a trial court
could deny a motion to compel a husband to submit to blood tests because the husband's pri-
vacy interests and society's interest in protecting families outweighed the putative father's
19981
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As for the rights of an unwed biological father to receive notice, a
hearing, and a veto of adoption proceedings involving his child, the Su-
preme Court has articulated a right of opportunity interest in parenthood.191
State courts have held, in the context of pre-birth and early infant adoptions,
that expressing interest in the child, objecting to adoption of the child, and
participating in the adoption proceedings may sufficiently manifest an un-
wed father's, intent to seize his opportunity interest. 192 Pre-birth commit-
ment by a father often is considered in the context of the waiver of his pa-
rental right to object to an adoption.
193
In the scheme of [Steven A. v. Rickie M (In re Adoption of Kelsey S.), 823 P.2d
1216 (Cal. 1992)] and [In re Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990)],
once a man "fathers" a child, he acquires an "opportunity interest" in it that
must be evaluated independently of his relationship with the mother or intent
to form a family unit with her.
19
The custody rules regarding children reveal the inconclusiveness of dis-
position determination. The fathers in both Davis and Kass asserted that if
they lost the custody fight over the preembryos, they would seek custody of
interest in asserting his paternity); see also Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 904-05 (Md.
1993) (holding that it was error to treat a husband as having subordinate rights to those of his
ex-wife, the natural mother, and his ex-wife's lover, the natural father, where the nature and
duration of his relationship with the child was such that he had clearly acted as a father and
continued parental rights were in the best interests of the child); Ettore I. v. Angela D., 513
N.Y.S.2d 733, 739 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that a natural father was estopped from assert-
ing paternity where a natural mother's husband had become the "psychological parent" of the
child citation and internal quotations omitted)).
See supra notes 106-08 (citing case law about the rights of unwed biological fathers to
veto the adoption of their children); infra note 193 (same).
192 See, e.g., In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545, 556 (La. 1990) (holding that an
unwed father made sufficient efforts to demonstrate his devotion to his child); In re Baby Girl
S., 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990) (finding that a personal and legal action by an unwed
putative father was sufficient to activate his liberty interest in his relationship with his putative
child). Commitment to the child's mother may not be a necessary expression of parental in-
terest. See, e.g., Doe v. Chambers, 374 S.E.2d 758, 759-60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a
father's efforts to establish a parental relationship sufficient although he did not know the
child's mother was pregnant and did not know about the child until two months after the
child's birth).
193 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 1797, 1797-98 & nn.222-24
(citing Doe v. Roe (In re Adoption of Doe), 543 So. 2d 741, 747 (Fla. 1989), and holding that
a father who favored abortion, who failed to provide emotional or material support during
gestation, and who would not commit to marriage had waived his right to block adoption as a
result of"abandonment"). But see In re Adoption of Stunkard, 551 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (holding that the statutory period for a father to perform parental duties did not toll
durin gestation).
Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 1801-02.
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any resultant children.195 It would be difficult to contend that the fathers
had behaved in a manner inconsistent with parenthood. Rather, they would
have behaved in a manner inconsistent with parenthood only in the context
of dissolving their marriages.
In the context of IVF disputes, the deferrence to the parties' contract is
grounded in the belief that parties should be able to resolve their own intra-
family disputes. 196 Repose, however, could be precluded by state custody
laws. For example, the parties' IVF contract, which granted custody of the
frozen embryos to one parent, would be honored out of respect for the pri-
vacy of the family. Ultimately, however, custody of any children would de-
pend on state-created law regarding the rights and responsibilities of bio-
logical parents against one another and towards a child. Custody battles
would likely ensue, with issues of great complexity, far exceeding those of
the clearly adulterous mother in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 197 or the unknown
parents in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca.
198
An additional problem in bargaining under a contract regime is the
question of enforceability. 199 That is, contracts are formed against the
background of the extant law, and must account for those rules. For two
gender-specific reasons, IVF dispositional contracts ought not be given ef-
fect in the absence of a contemporaneous agreement. First, because a
200woman retains the right to abort a pregnancy, any woman carrying thedisputed embryo would have the ability to frustrate the presumptive ration-
195 Junior Davis was explicit: "He testified quite clearly that if these preembryos were
brought to term he would fight for custody of his child or children." Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). Steven Kass was less explicit, although no less adamant. "'I
don't want to have children raised with Maureen. It is going to create a very strained, dys-
functional family situation,' Kass said.. . ." Blaine Harden, N.Y. High Court to Decide Fate
of Embryos that Survived Split, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1998, at A2. "'I don't want my kids
being brought up by her,' Steven [Kass] says." Adam Cohen, Test Tube Tug-of-War, TuIE,
Apr. 6, 1998, at 65, 65.
196 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that contracts between
gamete donors which specify the disposition of their pre-zygotes are presumed to be binding).
197 491 U.S. 110, 113-15 (1989) (concerning a challenge by a biological father to a Cali-
fornia paternity law and against a biological mother and her husband with respect to a child
with whom the husband had established a relationship).
198 Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (Ct. App.
1998) (involving two biological parents, two gestational parents, and two would-be legal par-
ents).
199 See Marston, supra note 179, at 910 ("[Legal rules affecting the parties' relative ne-
gotiating power influence the outcome of the negotiations."); see also Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 978-79 (1979) (discussing the effects of different judicial legal standards on the relative
bargaining power of the parties).
200 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the jurisprudence in the right to privacy area, in-
cluding one's rights to marriage, divorce, procreation, and abortion).
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ale for the award in the first place-preference for life. Second, if a woman
carries a pregnancy to term, she may have the power to preclude a father's
assertion of rights in the adoption context, simply by not informing the
agency or state of the natural father's identity.2 1 With respect to custody
disputes over nonmarital children, it is the rule that a biological mother is
the natural guardian of the child with rights and duties greater than those of
the biological father.202  Where the biological mother does not reveal the
identity of the natural father, an adoption will not be void on a subsequent
challenge by the natural father.203
The reluctance to bind parties to contracts that were formed prior to
marital dissolution and that concern children is due to the State's interests in
the welfare of its citizens. 204 Similar concerns have led to strict scrutiny of
spousal support agreements. 205 The general principle animating this scru-
tiny is that where a contract affects only the parties to the contract, it need
not be scrutinized so carefully; however, where the agreement of the parties
impacts third parties or society generally, there is a stronger state interest in
the substance of the agreement.
206
201 See Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 1797 n.221 (noting that states are divided with
respect to the rights of unwed fathers to notice of adoption and termination of parental rights).
202 See Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Right of Putative Father to Custody of illegitimate
Child, 45 A.L.R. 3D 216, 220, 223-24 (1972 & Supp. 1998) (explaining that courts have gen-
erally held a biological father's rights to come before all other's rights, except for those of the
natural mother).
203 See In re Adoption of S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Ark. 1988) (holding that there
was no constitutional violation where, due to concerns about religion and privacy, a mother
did not reveal the name of the father who did not know of his child's birth and thus had not
formed a relationship with the child); In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770, 772 (Del. 1986)
(holding that an unwed father's parental rights were terminable without notice where the child
had been in foster care for one year and where the mother's privacy interests justified not dis-
closing the father). It is interesting that the State may severely limit an individual's right of
procreation where a third party is affected. Further, it is noteworthy that such deprivations
would be almost impossible within a marriage. An unwed father only gains limited procrea-
tive rihts, subject to his acting like a wed father.
2u4 See Atwood, supra note 179, at 139-40 (noting that by utilizing the rationale of citi-
zens' welfare, "courts have reasoned that agreements affecting property rights should be
evaluated as of the time of execution whereas agreements affecting support rights should be
assessed as of the time of the divorce").
205 See id. at 136, 139-40 (discussing the variety of standards used by different courts to
scrutinize such agreements).
206 See id. at 132, 139-40 (noting the State's interest in stable marriages and the welfare
of its citizens); see also Marston, supra note 179, at 898 & n.90 (explaining that "[tihe most
common types of provisions that courts have held invalid contravening public policy concern
children, including waiver of child support, custody, or visitation rights"). In addition, courts
generally do not enforce contractual provisions governing the conduct of an intact marriage.
See id. at 900 (noting that courts adhere to the "well-established rule that it is improper for
courts to interfere in a married couple's daily domestic affairs" (citation and internal quota-
tions omitted)).
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In sum, the impact of the contracts on third parties, especially children,
and the nature of the parents' relationship often stand as obstacles to strict
enforcement of such contracts.
207
C. Revocability oflVFAgreements
In light of the family rights and responsibilities explained in this Com-
ment, a reasonable interpretation of the nature of the IVF endeavor, one
which minimizes such disputes, should be sought. Simplistic IVF contracts
generally ignore the divisible nature of the process. That is, donations of
sperm and eggs create later options to exercise contracts concerned with
implantation. Each implantation is thus a separate event, permitting and re-
quiring mutual consent.20 8 It is not only that the IVF forum provides for the
consent of both parties prior to each implantation; it requires it.
209
For example, marriage is commonly acknowledged to be a contractual
relationship, though the nature of the contract is disputed.210 Yet, in recent
years marriage has become terminable at the will of either party.211 What
once was understood as an irrevocable commitment is no longer considered
as such. This shift is due to the fact that a bad marriage benefits no one.
207 A recent case in California illustrates the complex tangle of relationships which may
arise as a result of IVF. The case involved two unrelated biological parents (donors), two
gestational parents (surrogate and her husband), and two parents by "intent." After three years
of litigation, the first three of the child's life, matters seem to have come to a rest. See Buz-
zanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the parents by "intent" were the parents by law); see also Annas, supra note 8, at
935 (discussing the conclusion of the Buzzanca court that the parents by the intent were the
legal parents because it was their contract which caused the child to be created).
Although the case, by the time of litigation, involved an extant pregnancy and is thus not
applicable directly to the IVF context, it illustrates potential conflicts which are likely to arise
after a disputed disposition. Science has made the lawyer's hypothetical real.
208 Cf Dehmel, supra note 4, at 1400 ("Cryopreservation... [adds] further steps of
freezing and thawing the preembryos. As a result, there is room, and moreover a responsibil-
ity to accommodate the effect of shifting circumstances upon the parties' consent").
209 Compare the IVF scenario where a couple undergoes treatment to that where a
woman or man obtains sperm or eggs, respectively, from a donor's bank. In the latter case, it
is not suggested that consent of the donor is necessary. The act of donating "at large" evi-
dences no intent to be a parent. It is not only a waiver against one party, but a waiver against
all the world of one's interest in avoiding biological parenthood. The IVF context is more
analogous to the consensual procreative behavior of couples in their bedrooms. No longer
does a spouse have "access" by the mere fact of consent to marriage.
210 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878) (characterizing marriage
as a sacred obligation and a civil contract); Moskowitz, supra note 184, at A25 (noting that
although marriage is legal status, it is not treated as a private contract entitling one spouse to
legal or equitable relief).
211 See HARRis Er AL., supra note 65, at 293-306 (discussing the advent and prevalence
of "no-fault" divorce).
1998]
474 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Similarly, Where childbirth will predictably entail dispute and hardship, and
where a person in a constitutional and biological sense has not developed,
the IVF contract need not be treated as binding or deserving of specific per-
formance.
D. Inability to Achieve the Aims of Privacy and Autonomy
Leaving the parties to the language of IVF contracts will necessarily in-
volve courts in the most intimate decisions a couple can make. Worse, it
will not clarify the rights and expectations of the parties. Witness, for ex-
ample, the dispute among the five Kass judges in the intermediate appellate
court as to whether the language in the agreement revealed an unambiguous
intent. Despite the existence of a contract, legal proceedings and analysis
often will ensue.
Moreover, there will be inevitable lapses of contract. For example, the
facility to which Mary Sue and Junior Davis went did have an informed
consent document which the facility provided as a matter of policy. Due to
the facility's move to a different location, however, the documents were un-
available at the time the Davises began treatment.212
E. Material Term of the Contract Was Marriage
Couples who enroll in IVF clinics as couples usually envision parent-
hood and children only within marriage.213 Individuals, as couples, will
only enroll in the hopes that they will be able to become parents together.
2 14
Moreover, clinic selection procedures may emphasize the centrality of mar-
riage to the decision to have children, such that participants are there only
because they want children within the context of marriage. 215 When couples
212 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 n.9 (Tenn. 1992) ("Apparently the clinic
was in the process of moving its location when the Davises underwent this last round
and... it was impossible to postpone the procedure until the appropriate forms were lo-
cated."); Poole, supra note 25, at 91 ("[Tjhere will always be situations in which the parties
did not contract and for which a default rule is needed.").
213 "Instead of the ultimate goal being mere pregnancy, the parties might only have in-
tended to have a child as a couple." Dehmel, supra note 21, at 1400; see also Ryan, supra
note 27, at 1945 (noting that infertility is often met with intense "determination of infertile
couples to have a child of their own by almost any means possible").
214 See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181 (N.Y. 1998) (taking the continued use of"we"
in the contract as evidence that "they above all did not want... a stranger taking that decision
our of their hands," and giving no serious weight to the contention that the contract was only
intended to be for the benefit of the clinic or that it manifested the cognitive dissonance and
psychological resistance which may characterize such agreements).
215 See Steinberg, supra note 64, at 36-39 (criticizing the practice of British IVF clinics to
select couples based on a perceived commitment to children within marriage).
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divorce and are no longer able to become parents together, the terms of their
agreement have been frustrated and should not be specifically enforced. 216
V. THE RIGHT TO BEAR OR BEGET: VETO OF IVF IMPLANTATION
Having said much, a brief recap may be in order. First, IVF makes it
possible for many couples to bear genetically-related children. It also, how-
ever, confronts divorcing couples with the question of who should be able to
control disposition of unused frozen embryos. Second, the dynamic nature
of these embryos must be borne in mind and, although they are early in the
continuum of life, they are entitled to special respect. Third, the constitu-
tional right to procreation is derived from the right to family. Consequently,
the State may extend greater procreational freedom to those who have as-
sumed the obligations and responsibilities of marriage than it inust grant to
those who have made no such promises. Fourth, contracts are an inappro-
priate, inadequate means of protecting the privacy of families and often may
have the anomalous results of making private interests public. Moreover,
contractual resolution may be undermined by laws regarding child cus-
tody-laws directly implicated precisely because the embryo is dynamic.
The embryo has the potential to become a constitutional person, and in so
doing, to render one adjudication meaningless in the face of a later one.
Consequently, another rubric is needed to provide guidance to couples
who avail themselves of IVF procedures. Professor Carl Schneider suggests
that current responses to difficult moral and ethical questions are resolved
frequently in one of two fashions: deference to ad hoe committee decision-
making (whether the committee is composed of parents or professionals),
217
or rights-based solutions. 211 Parts II and IV of this Comment attempt to de-
fine the interests at issue and illustrate the ineffectiveness of case-by-case
resolution in protecting these or other social interests. Rather, I suggest a
rights-based approach. It is helpful to consider such solutions in light of
216 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) (explaining that a
duty of performance is discharged upon the "occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption orwhich the contract was made"). It is helpful to recall the
suggestion from Part IV.A that people do not expect to divorce, even though they know they
may. See also id. § 265 (discharging a duty of performance where the principal purpose of the
party has been "substantially frustrated... by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made").
217 See Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REv.
151, 154 (1988) (discussing whether hospital committees should decide if neonatal euthanasia
is appropriate or whether it should be a parent's right to decide).
Is See id. at 153-54 (suggesting that rights discourse may preclude a more valuable so-
cial discussion of seemingly intractable disputes involving a confluence of legal, ethical, and
emotional concerns).
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Professor Scheider's three principal objections to intra-family rights-based
arguments. First, he notes that rights discourse is derived from the "Mill
paradigm," which conceives of rights as those of the individual against the
power of the State.219 The obvious problem, he suggests, is that family dis-
putes generally pit one member against another, and neither against the
220State. Second, he argues that there is no cohesive theory of the origin or
incidents of the rights of family, thus giving little guidance for weighing the
rights of parents and children.221 Finally, he discusses the social and psy-
chological consequences of rights discourse-encouraging the more self-
interested impulses of the individual as opposed to the imposition of a bur-
den on the individual for social reasons. 22  Ultimately, he argues, the lack
of any clear limits on "privacy" rights approaches will encourage a fear of
slippery slopes, distorting the argument and polarizing society. 2Z
In light of Schneider's concerns, and in light of the social limits on in-
dividual rights and the constitutional origins of the right of procreation, this
Part reviews several other suggested approaches to embryo disposition dis-
putes. Finally, a bright-line rule is proposed.
A. Interest Balancing
In Davis, the court weighed the relative interests of the specific parties
in their rights of procreation and non-procreation.Y 4 The Davis court estab-
lished a presumption in favor of the party opposed to implantation, subject
to consideration of the interests of the party who favored implantation when
implantation was that party's last reasonable opportunity to achieve parent-
219 See id. at 157 (describing the failure of the "Mill paradigm" in family law situations).
220 See id. at 157-58 (noting that because both parties are individuals, an individual ver-
sus individual scenario makes ineffective our general presumption that the individual's rights
are given more weight than society's).
21 See id. at 158-59 (noting that in many legal controversies, there is a theory to guide
the court in making their decision, usually a political theory, which is absent in the parental
rights question).
See id. at 161-63 (discussing failures, such as Prohibition, of the law's attempt to en-
courage people to make certain moralistic decisions). In this respect, Schneider echoes a fa-
miliar theme: legal rights are conceived of as those of the individual and tend to encourage
meaner, self-concerned behavior, in contrast with moral rights, which recognize obligations
and encourage relationships.
223 See id. at 166-73 (describing the various insufficiencies of both the liberal and con-
servative views of rights in the neonatal euthanasia debate and discussing how both sides em-
ploy the use of warnings about the slippery slope dangers of the other side in defense of their
ownrosition).
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) ("If no prior agreement [re-
garding the fate of the frozen embryos] exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using
or not using the preembryos must be weighed.").
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225hood. The Davis court thought its interest balancing was supported by
Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to procreate and an equivalent
right not to procreate.
2 26
This interest-balancing analysis ignores several issues. First, the bal-
ancing analysis converts the inquiry into what the contract analysis sought
to avoid in the first place-an intrusion on the sacred space of individual
decision-making and private ordering.227  Finding that the decisions in-
volved concerned intimate and private matters, the court ironically adopted
a default rule certain to increase, rather than decrease, the level of intrusion
into that private sphere. 8
Second, the Davis court's opinion presumed that the rights to procreate
and not to procreate were of equal weight for an unwed couple. This pre-
sumption is questionable. The rights at issue are anchored in marriage and
private consent. 229 When such rights have been extended beyond the mari-
tal relationship, they have only reached situations where their exercise was
sought to limit the socially injurious consequences of sexual relationships:
access to contraception and abortion.23
0
Considered against the criteria set forth at the beginning of this Part,
these failings are fatal. First, a balancing analysis does not preclude the
potentially unclear and public custody litigation that would follow implan-
225 See id. ("If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using
the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.").
226 See id. at 598-603 (examining the history of the right to privacy and procreation by
reviewing Supreme Court cases including Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); and Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); cf supra Part II.B (discussing the constitutional rights to pri-
vacy, including marriage, procreation, and abortion).
227 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603 (arguing that the dramatic impact of parenthood on the
individuals who comprise a couple "supports their right to sole decisional authority as to
whether the process of attempting to gestate these preembryos should continue"); see also
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (recognizing "liberty relating to inti-
mate relationships, the family, and decisions whether or not to beget or bear a child"); Kass v.
Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 590 (App. Div. 1997) (finding the informed consent document evi-
dence of the parties' intent involving "intensely personal and essentially private matters which
are appropriately resolved by the prospective parents rather than the courts"), affd, 696
N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
228 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (holding that an interest-balancing approach should be
used as a default rule when no prior agreement exists as to the disposition of the preembryos).
229 See supra Part II.B (explaining that the rights of procreational privacy originated in
cases stressing the importance of protecting the procreative marital relationship from govern-
mental interference).
230 See supra Part ll.B (analyzing cases that discuss the rights to procreation and abortion
in terms of the burdens that unwanted pregnancies place on both married and unmarried per-
sons).
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tation.231 Second, an interest-balancing analysis vests in an individual, who
expressly disavows a social contract, a right derived therefrom. 232  In so
doing, a balancing analysis severs the line holding the right to procreation to
the constitutional anchor of the right to privacy within the marital relation-
ship. Third, a balancing analysis explicitly pits one family member against
another, creating an awkward clash of rights that are normally understood to
exist only against the State.2 33 Fourth, a balancing analysis encourages vit-
riolic custody fights, two such cases having been taken to state high
courts.234  The interest-balancing analysis uses a questionable means to
achieve uncertain ends. A better way is sought.
B. The Sweat Equity Model
Under the Sweat Equity model for rights allocation, the party who has
invested the most in the procedure should be given discretion over the dis-
position of the embryos.235
This model is inappropriate on pragmatic grounds. First, the physical
investment argument would seem to justify a woman's absolute control over
all reproductive decisions, because she will seem to invest more in the proc-
ess.236 She will not always invest more, however. Recall that IVF may be
necessary due to male factor infertility.237 It is noteworthy that a man "can
now share with his partner the various invasive medical technologies" such
as intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which involves biopsy of a testi-
cle and aspiration of sperm.238 Even where male factor infertility is not a
central issue, "[s]emen collection may be especially difficult because the
231 See supra Part IV.B (arguing that legal rights involved in IVF disputes can be unclear
due to the weight given to the third party and social interests considered in subsequent child
custody disputes).
23 See supra Part l1.B (explaining that procreational privacy was found archetypally in
the marital relationship).
233 See supra note 227 and accompanying text (referring to the difficulty of weighing the
rights of individuals against those of other individuals when the rights at issue were created
specifically against the government).
24 See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) and
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998)).
235 See John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 7, 7-8 (describing and critiquing the Sweat Equity model).
236 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (describing the process of in vitro fer-
tilization and the demands placed upon the woman's body, including ovarian hyperstimula-
tion, aspiration of the eggs, and insemination).
See Davis & Rosenwaks, supra note 8, at 2320-22 (discussing the causes of infertil-
ity)238 Olivennes & Frydman, supra note 12, at 1121 (criticizing the prevalence of invasive
and burdensome IVF techniques).
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emotional pressure to perform and to provide a good-quality specimen is
particularly powerful."' z 9 The Sweat Equity inquiry is unclear and intru-
sive, requireing detailed physical and emotional analysis in open court.
Prior to implantation, the parties stand on uniquely equal ground. To tilt the
surface may cast all couples down a slippery slope.
Second, the Sweat Equity model introduces a new inquiry which never
before has been applied in the area of reproductive, as opposed to custodial,
privacy-the degree to which a specific person is personally invested in the
procreative event.240 Further, the Sweat Equity model is inconsistent with
many state custody and adoption statutes which focus on the welfare and
well-being of a child, not solely on the parental investment in the child.24'
Where a third person will be impacted by the exercise of individual discre-
tion, courts have inquired as to the consequences of a course of action, not
the parties' personal investment in the action itself.24 2 The embryo is not, of
course, a constitutional "person." 243 The point, however, is that the embryo
239 Applegarth, supra note 46, at 1960.
240 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court considered the general im-
pact of compulsory loss of the reproduction function. See supra notes 55-61 and accompa-
nying text (describing the application of strict scrutiny to a law requiring the forced steriliza-
tion of some felons). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court deferred to
the general privacy of a married couple despite the fact that their reception of contraceptives
was at a public discussion. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (analyzing the
grounds for the privacy right found in Griswold). In Eisenstandt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), a single person presented a successful facial challenge to a law prohibiting the sale of
contraceptives to, or use of contraceptive by, single persons. See supra notes 72-75 and ac-
companying text (describing the extension of the privacy right found in Griswold to unmarried
persons). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), an abortion prohibition was facially uncon-
stitutional because of the harms of unwanted pregnancy and parenthood generally, but the law
was not analyzed as it applied to individuals. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text
(describing the extension of the privacy right to the decision of a woman to terminate a preg-
nancy). And in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the Court declined to confer a
right of parenthood on an adulterous father despite his relationship with his biological child,
deferring to the general principle favoring marriage. See supra note 106 (upholding a law that
privileged the rights of a husband over those of a man claiming to be the biological father of a
child). In all these cases and more, the inquiry has been general and not specific.
241 See supra Parts IV.A-B (describing the various factors given weight in adoption and
custody decisions).
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54 (balancing the infringement of a woman's privacy right if
abortion is forbidden against the harm to the State's interests in regulating health and medi-
cine and protecting potential life if abortion is allowed); see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 598 (Tenn. 1992) (characterizing the central inquiry as "whether the parties will become
parents"); supra Part IV.B (emphasizing state law's reluctance to enforce, per se, contracts
that are made in advance and that are related to adoption or custody of children).
243 See supra Part II.A (arguing that the "special respect" view of the preembryo is the
best characterization).
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may come to be a "person" in the future, and, moreover, the disposition of
the embryo will not conclusively settle all custody disputes.
244
Third, granting custody based on investment ensures nothing. As
shown earlier, a woman may abort a pregnancy free of any veto power by
her partner.245 Consequently, she may thwart a disposition favoring im-
plantation--even for spite.
Analyzed against Professor Schneider's criteria set out at the beginning
of this Part, the Sweat Equity Model is also inadequate. First, it gives an
individual a right derived from the family and necessarily draws the public
246into the private realm as an arbiter. Second, it attempts to evaluate the
rights of a married couple to procreate as against other individuals where
those rights have previously existed against the State only.247 Third, it does
not ensure wise results, as a spiteful ex-spouse could seek custody only to
abort. Nor would it prevent custody battles over any resultant children. The
meaner impulses would be encouraged and the parties would wield their le-
gal rights to the detriment of possible moral duties.
C. An Automatic Right to Implantation
Another argument advanced by some commentators favors the auto-
matic right to implantation.24s This right, however, is illusory. First, it has
no basis in the Constitution. Recall that there is no case which stands for
the right of one person to compel procreational assistance from another.
249
Second, the right is an illusion even if enforced because the person who im-
plants the preembryo will always be a woman who will have an automatic
veto over the pregnancy as part of her right to an abortion. 25 Moreover, be-
cause unwed, biological fathers have a fleeting right to develop a relation-
244 See supra Part IV.B (describing the obstacles that state custody laws place in the way
of settling the custody issues prior to birth).
245 See supra Parts II.B, IV.B (noting that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
cannot be stopped by her husband or the biological father of her child).
246 See supra Part I.B (arguing that the courts base procreational privacy rights on the
marital relationship).
247 See supra Part II.B (describing the origin of the privacy right in the marriage relation-
ship).
248 The American Bar Association recently shelved a proposal which would have favored
the spouse seeking to implant the preembryos. See No ABA Embryo Policy, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 1998, at A5 (describing the informal vote at the ABA annual meeting and the general
contours of the policy); see also Panitch, supra note 8, at 545 (favoring implantation where
the s&ouse seeking custody accepts sole responsibility for the child's care).
See supra Part II.B (explaining the limited nature of the right to procreate).
250 See supra Parts IV.B-C (explaining the right to abortion and the impact it could have
on a contract analysis).
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ship with their genetic offspring,251 implantation may drive the noncustodial
spouse to intervene in a custody battle to preserve parental rights. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that men's attitudes towards child rearing are
changing, strengthening the argument that men may be affected by the
knowledge that they have children whom they do not know or raise.
2 52
Consequently, implantation will not resolve any child custody disputes but
is only a temporary fix to a larger problem? 5 3 Third, this right does not ad-
dress the concern of the spouse opposing implantation: he or she does not
want the irrevocability of parenthood outside of marriage. The "decision to
have or to forego having a child is one of the most crucial and, at a certain
point, uniquely irrevocably [sic] decisions that individuals face." '254 In this
respect, it is important to recall the psychological significance of genetic re-
production to most people.255 Biology has always received strong consid-
eration in the law: "The traditional rule, both in custody and visitation dis-
putes, is that a [biological] parent prevails against a non-parent, unless
shown to be unfit or to have abandoned his or her rights. '25 6 Consequently,
parents who have undergone IVF may be unwilling to accept the fact that
they have biological offspring for whom they do not function as parents in a
nurturing sense.
251 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing several cases dealing with the
rights of unwed fathers in adoption proceedings).
252 See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 48, 48-52
(discussing the "Father's Rights Movement," comprised of "various factions" which share the
belief "in the importance of father involvement in families" and are working to effectuate it);
Karen Secombe, Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Children: Gender Comparisons Among
Childfree Husbands and Wives, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 191, 200 (1991) (finding that "men
rate the importance of having children higher than women do, and they are also more apt to
want to become parents themselves"); supra note 193 (explaining the testimony of a spouse
that if embryos were brought to term, custody of the child would be sought). "[W]hile men
and women do not differ in the importance placed upon benefits and/or costs
[of] ... parenthood, different factors do indeed emerge as significant determinants of their
perceptions. For too long, data on men have been ignored because of the presumption that
women are responsible for fertility decisions." Secombe, supra, at 201. The Supreme Court
has recognized that assumed distinctions in the relationships between men and women and
their children, drawn broadly along gender lines, are not constitutional. See Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that a statutory definition of fitness to be a par-
ent, which distinguished between men and women generally, was contrary to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
253 See supra Part IV.B (describing the potential for complex custody disputes should
implantation proceed despite one parent's opposition).
254 Mary-Joan Gerson et al., The Wish for a Child in Couples Eager, Disinterested, and
ConflictedAbout Having Children, 19 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 334,342 (1991).
255 See Applegarth, supra note 46, at 1960 (noting the unique importance to patients of a
bioloical relationship with their child).
Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 1785 n.149 (quoting IRA M. ELLMAN Er AL., FAMILY
LAW: CAsEs, TEXT, PROBLEMS 600 (2d ed. 1991)).
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It has been suggested that the focus of parental rights ought to be on the
257rights of children-a focus on nurturing. Extending this analysis, the
parent most willing or able to nurture the child would be entitled to custody.
Three responses are appropriate. First, there is no denying the strength of
biological attachment, as noted above. Second, in an IVF context, concep-
tion is delayed. The parties' relationship could go bad before conception
occurs. Realization of potential life at this point is statistically unlikely. 8
The promise of life is too remote and too attenuated. Moreover, a gesta-
tional parent may always thwart the interest of the other nurturing parent by
aborting the pregnancy. Finally, the failure of the marriage before the need
for nurturing the child arises should inform our sensibilities as to the long-
term consequences: if we reward only nurture, custody disputes would ac-
tually increase because parents would fight even harder from the outset of
the dispute. Parents would know that, with the importance of biological ties
legally limited, the opportunity interest in gaining custody would be even
more pivotal than before.
D. The Right to Procreate-The Right to No
IVF is a new technology. It has made dreams come true for many, but
the price of those dreams is uncertain. Specifically, the scientific data re-
garding the harms and long-term consequences of IVF are not clear at all.
259
This is particularly frightening given the lack of regulation of IVF proce-
dures.26°
Against the backdrop of this unregulated technology, courts and couples
need a clear understanding of how to resolve disputes over the disposition of
frozen embryos. The legal principles set forth in this Comment lead to the
conclusion that implantation requires contemporaneous mutual consent for a
257 See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 103, at 1749 (advocating 'generism' that would
evaluate parents' authority over children and their obligations to children, and to each other,
through the lens of children's needs and experiences").
8 See Rutter, supra note 7, at 68 (noting that a 25% pregnancy rate is probably high).
259 See Olivennes & Frydman, supra note 12, at 1121 (discussing the potential dangers of
IVF for women); E.R. te Velde et al., Concerns About Assisted Reproduction, 351 LANCEr
1524, 1525 (1998) (discussing the potential harm to children's genetic material by IVF and
currently inadequate tests for genetic damage, concluding that techniques "should be assessed
extensively," and analogizing the threat of genetic damage to that of"[l]essons learnt from the
unexpected effects on fetal development of drugs that were not adequately assessed"); Tem-
pleton & Morris, supra note 13, at 573 (characterizing the IVF risk of multiple births as a
"major health issue").
260 See Annas, supra note 7, at 938 (assessing the need for federal regulation of assisted
reproduction); ISLAT Working Group, supra note 7, at 651 (noting that adoption is more
heavily regulated than assisted reproduction and suggesting reforms).
[Vol. 147:435
IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
married couple and that their divorce will result in the destruction or dona-
tion of unused frozen embryos.
This rule recognizes the differences between married and unmarried
persons. As interpreted, the right to procreate has its roots in the marital
relation.261 Such a distinction is constitutional because married couples as-
sume obligations as a matter of law which single persons do not.?62 Moreo-
ver, sexual intercourse between certain populations remains illegal.263
There is also a constitutional right not to procreate. First found within
marriage, this right was later extended to single persons in an effort to
minimize the social consequences of consensual, albeit sometimes illegal,
sex.264 Most significantly, the right was extended to include a woman's
ability to terminate a pregnancy rather than suffer a lifetime of irrevocable
parenthood.
2 65
Finally, state law favoring marriage over biology and seeking to mini-
mize intrusion into private matters favors a restriction of the procreational
rights of an individual when that right is, or may be, opposed by another in-
dividual whose procreational rights are implicated.
When analyzed against Professor Schneider's critique of rights-based
solutions, this Comment's proposal fares well. First, the rule does not pit
the right of one individual against the rights of another, but rather says that,
as a constitutional matter, neither person individually possesses these
rights.266 Thus, it is not as much of a legal quandary as a "Mill paradigm"
267might present. Consequently, the status quo is preserved at the sufferance
of no rights. Second, the rule is drawn from a cohesive, if controversial,
understanding of the privacy right to procreation: it is granted to those
married in exchange for their assumption of the responsibilities of mar-
261 See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the Court's treatment of marriage and procreation as
protected rights).
262 See supra note 108 and accompanying text (noting that married fathers have been
given greater rights than unmarried fathers on the grounds that they have incurred greater ob-
ligations).
263 See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1996) (criminalizing fornication, which is intercourse
between unmarried individuals); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1997) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 272 § 18 (1998) (same).
264 See supra Part II.B (discussing the limited extension to unmarried persons of a pri-
vacy right grounded in marriage).
265 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (describing the Roe Court's view of an
unwanted pregnancy as a harm and a burden).
266 See supra Part ll.B (noting that the privacy right is based in the marriage relation-
shipt .
See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (explaining that people usually think
of rights as against the State only).
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riage.268 It does not suffer from the doctrinal atomization that is character-
istic of pleas for individual rights. The rule derives from a limited, but
faithful, understanding of Supreme Court cases.269 The rule is notable for
its restriction, but not violent in its constitutional interpretation. Third, the
rule prevents disposition disputes and, unlike a rule favoring implantation, it
precludes custody battles over resulting children. Such a rule does not add a
bargaining chip (that otherwise would not exist) to a divorce battle because
it presupposes disagreement and does not condition its grant on the parties'
bargain. Finally, the rule recognizes that children are social beings and that
assisted reproduction "involves creating children and building families, a
fundamental social value."
270
Hearts are sure to break, yet this will occur no matter which course is
chosen: the response is implicit in a dispute over such an intimate matter.
Nonetheless, the decision to have a child is private only as between two per-
sons and has infinite social consequences. Consenting married adults en-
gaged in a course of married conduct, for which they assume responsibility
in exchange for the grant of a right, are in a different position than those
who have assumed no such obligations but seek the same opportunities.
Their rights to procreation are not the same, and there is no need for a judi-
cial construction to read them as the same.
CONCLUSION
This Comment evaluates the right to custody of frozen embryos pro-
duced by IVF. It demonstrates that currently, a preference for a contract
analysis exists, such that courts profess a willingness to honor any agree-
ment made by the parties at an earlier time. It also demonstrates that a con-
tract analysis is inappropriate, inadequate, and anomalous.
268 See supra Part 3.B.2 (describing the extension of greater rights over children to those
who accept greater parental responsibilities over children).
269 See supra Part I.B (reading the language of procreative rights cases against the facts
and circumstances from which they emanated).
270 ISLAT Working Group, supra note 7, at 652; see also Annas, supra note 7, at 937
("[C]ertain aspects of these decisions have such a strong impact on matters of concern to soci-
ety.., that they require public scrutiny and regulation." (citations omitted)) In this respect,
the effect of a single-parent upbringing or of contentious parental relations on children are
notably negative. See, e.g., MARK ABRAHAMSON, OUT OF WEDLOCK BIRTHS: THE UNITED
STATES iN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 17 (1998) (explaining the significance of parent-child
bonds for both parents); J. Owusu-Bempah, Information About the Absent Parent as a Factor
in the Well-Being of Children of Single-Parent Families, 38 INT'L SOC. WORK 253, 266-70
(1995) (explaining hardships as being based on the quantity and quality of information about
an absent person).
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This Comment also analyzes the right to procreate. Considering the
source of that right, this Comment suggests that prior to pregnancy, the
positive and negative facets of the right to procreation are limited to the
marital relation, while its negative aspects are extended to single individuals
as a socially justified limit on responsibility. This Comment suggests that a
bright-line rule in the IVF context best comports with constitutional inter-
pretation, policy considerations, and judicial objectives. Implantation by a
married couple requires contemporaneous mutual consent and implantation
by a divorcing couple who dispute the disposition is precluded. Simply, this
Comment argues that the right to procreate, in the context of IVF, need not
and should not go beyond the right to say no.
* * * * * *
